GOMEZ ORTIZ, Diana Carolina. The Uncertainty of Cooperation Benefit Programs. []. , 30, 1, pp.27-67.   27--2021. ISSN 0120-8942.  https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2021.30.1.2.

This paper reflects on the rivalry between criminal policy and leniency pro grams in competition law. The issuance of the Colombian anti-corruption code introduced the anti-competitive practice known as collusion in public procurement into competition law as a crime. This criminal policy aimed to punish more severely restrictive competition practices that adversely affect public procurement while discouraging their occurrence; however, it did not turn out as planned. The punishment conflicted with the leniency programs provided for in competition law. Through collaboration benefit programs, the legislator granted benefits such as the exemption of fines for those who reported anti-competitive conduct in exchange for information helpful to the authority. Nevertheless, when defining the leniency program, the legislator had not anticipated the possibility that restrictive competition conduct could be penalized by legal systems such as the criminal one. This disconnection between criminal policy and cooperation benefits would have discouraged people's participation in cooperation benefit programs. Therefore, this article discusses the effectiveness of Colombian cooperation benefit programs offered by the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce regarding the classification of collusion as a crime.

: Cooperation benefit programs; amnesty; accusation; restrictive competition practices; cartels; collusion in public procurement.

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