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Revista de Economía Institucional

Print version ISSN 0124-5996

Abstract

AREVALO B., Julián  and  OJEDA J., Jair. MORAL RISK AND CONTRACTS: CERTAIN EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE. Rev.econ.inst. [online]. 2004, vol.6, n.10, pp.47-69. ISSN 0124-5996.

This paper shows one type of asymmetric information problems, their theoretical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.

Keywords : moral risk; contracts; experimental evidence; asymmetric information.

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