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Revista de Economía Institucional

Print version ISSN 0124-5996

Abstract

SALAZAR, Boris. NASH AND VON NEUMANN: POSSIBLE WORLDS AND LANGUAGE GAMES. Rev.econ.inst. [online]. 2004, vol.6, n.10, pp.71-94. ISSN 0124-5996.

Using language game notions and the equivalence between games, this document studies John Nash’s decision of not playing the coalitional game proposed by John von Neumann. The key point is that Nash suggested hypothetical worlds that are incompatible with the kind proposed by von Neumann. And, at the root of this difference, lies their different notions of rationality.

Keywords : modal logic; possible worlds; rationality; language games; cooperative games; non-cooperative games.

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