2.1 International entrepreneurship (IE)

Entrepreneurship involves the ability and disposition to bear uncertainty and take advantage of business opportunities, developing new products or markets to increase profits (^{Venkataraman, 1997}). Entrepreneurship deals with autonomy, competitive aggressiveness, innovation, proactivity, risk-taking, venturing, and strategic renewal (^{Lumpkin & Dess, 1996}; ^{Zahra, 1993}). In an attempt to unify the definition for entrepreneurship, ^{Sharma and Chrisman (1999)} propose the following: “Entrepreneurship encompasses acts of organizational creation, renewal, or innovation that occur within or outside an existing organization” (p.17).

International entrepreneurship (IE) is a type of entrepreneurship that extends local boundaries. It seeks opportunities beyond domestic markets to increase competitiveness and returns. As such, internationalization is an entrepreneurial action, which involves innovation, risk-taking, and strategic change (Schumpter, 1934). International entrepreneurship has been defined as “a combination of innovative, proactive, and risk-seeking behavior that crosses national borders and is intended to create value in organizations” (^{McDougall & Oviatt, 2000, p. 903}). IE includes “cooperative alliances, corporate entrepreneurship, economic development initiatives, entrepreneur characteristics and motivations, exporting and other market entry modes, new ventures and initial public offerings (IPOs), transitioning economies, and venture financing” (^{McDougall & Oviatt, 2000, p. 903}).

International entrepreneurship involves both opportunities and challenges. It is a venture full of risks, where market and relational knowledge are vital (^{Casillas, Barbero, & Sapienza, 2015}). IE comprises top management motivation, commitment, and firm preparation; generally companies gradually become international, although some follow a rapid path and others are born global (^{Wright & Etemad, 2001}). The IE literature mentions three different internationalization dimensions: “time (to internationalization), market presence, and mode” (^{Dimitratos, Johnson, Plakoyiannaki, & Young, 2016, p. 1212}).

2.2. Family involvement and international entrepreneurship

Family firms, compared to non-family companies, face both restrictions and advantages in order to become international (^{Calabró & Mussolino, 2013}). Long-term orientation, high commitment, and a greater number of communication channels constitute positive family level components for IE. However, higher risk aversion and the search for alternative objectives (related to socio-emotional wealth) create barriers for IE. Therefore, the relationship between family involvement and IE is unclear (^{Daspit et al., 2017}; ^{Pukall & Calabró, 2014}).

Within family firms, inconclusive evidence has been found which suggests that the presence of family members in strategic positions impacts international entrepreneurship. Internationalization is complex and full of uncertainties. Family-member CEOs tend to have better information and more experience in their companies than non-family CEOs. This provides knowledge that can be used for new insights and innovation (^{Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Bares, 2015}), which gives companies headed by family-member CEOs an advantage when undergoing internationalization (^{Weerawardena, Sullivan, Mort, Liesch, & Knight, 2007}).

However, a family-member CEO might not have the adequate managerial skills in order to pursue international entrepreneurial acts (^{Pinheiro & Yung, 2015}). Family CEOs might make more conservative strategic decisions, being more cautious about internationalization ventures (^{Binacci, Peruffo, Oriani, & Minichilli, 2016}; ^{Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010}). Furthermore, family CEOs have limited exposure to the external environment, as most of their professional experiences lie within the family business. This limits CEOs’ aptitudes when visualizing novel prospects and promotes the conservation of the status quo (^{Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991}). In contrast, a non-family CEO offers the firm additional contacts and managerial/market knowledge (^{Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007}; ^{Claver, Rienda, & Quer, 2009}). The nomination of a non-family CEO favours the adoption of more risky initiatives and stimulates decisions based on logic and rational analysis (^{Block, 2011}). Accordingly, hypothesis 1 is proposed:

2.3. CEO tenure and international entrepreneurship

Tenure is an indicator of experience and human capital; it enlarges the ability to process information and make decisions (^{Herrmann & Datta, 2005}). Longer tenure facilitates the understanding and managing of complexities related to internationalization, which improves the odds of pursuing international entrepreneurship (^{Jaw & Lin, 2009}; ^{Rivas, 2012}). In addition, CEO tenure is associated with firm-specific knowledge, deeper networks, and better internal communication channels, which are crucial for international expansion (^{Li, 2018}).

Nevertheless, it has also been proven that long term CEOs avoid strategic changes (^{Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996}). The number of years that a CEO works with a firm is positively correlated with their preference to preserve the status quo (^{Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991}). Particularly in family firms, where risk-aversion is higher and decisions tend to be more conservative, CEOs’ tenure can reinforce the obstacles in the way of international entrepreneurship. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is proposed:

2.4. CEO Foreign exposure, education, and international entrepreneurship

CEOs’ experiences abroad, by working in external markets and/or studying in foreign institutions, increases their knowledge and willingness to pursue international ventures (^{Wei & Ling, 2015}). CEOs’ international exposure relates to achievements in foreign language proficiency and travel experience, in addition to better tolerance and understanding of other cultures and ways of doing business (^{Andersen & Rynning, 1994}; ^{Zucchella, Palamara, & Denicolai, 2007}). The latter reduces uncertainties from international endeavors and foments a global mindset (^{Hsu, Chen, & Cheng, 2013}; ^{Alayo, Maseda, Iturralde, & Arzubiaga, 2019}). It has been emphasized that CEOs who have lived in other countries tend to export more and internationalize their companies faster than others (^{Reuber & Fischer, 1999}). For these reasons, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Education raises human capital (^{Peni, 2014}). Management studies add knowledge, perspective, and understanding on how to run a business, and increase the willingness to exploit growth opportunities present in external markets (^{Andersen & Rynning, 1994}). A rigorous academic training favours the development of socio-cognitive skills, promoting the ability to learn and accept new ideas (^{Hitt & Tyler, 1991}) and also becoming more open-minded towards other cultures (^{Herrmann & Datta, 2005}). CEOs with elevated business educational qualifications are considered more adaptive and competent in implementing new strategies in response to changing market conditions (^{Goll, Johnson, & Rasheed, 2007}). Education provides tools and opportunities in order to process information faster and make better decisions. The higher the educational level, the greater the possibilities for CEOs to analyse complex situations and manage risk effectively, which encourages entrepreneurship (including IE). Previous studies have proven that highly educated CEOs are more interested in internationalization (^{Amorós, Etchebarne, Torres-Zapata, & Felzensztein, 2016}; ^{Ramón-Llorens et al., 2017}). Therefore, hypotheses 4 and 5 will be tested:

2.5. Board diversity and international entrepreneurship

Board diversity includes gender diversity, a combination of independent and non-independent board members, and a mixture of family and non-family directors. Board diversity has implications for the management of the firm and previous literature generally shows a positive effect on international entrepreneurship. Diversity implies different and complementary knowledge and abilities, which favors strategic complex decisions such as IE (^{Rivas, 2012}; ^{D´Angelo, Majocchi, & Buck, 2016}; ^{Alayo et al., 2019}).

It has been argued that gender diversity can increase international entrepreneurship, as the presence of women on boards expands firms’ competitive advantages due to their greater market understanding and the positive image they reflect on the customers (^{Ramón-Llorens et al., 2017}). In addition, women complement male capabilities and skills, which stimulate IE (^{Kirsch, 2018}). However, women tend to have less managerial and board experience than men, diminishing their potentially positive impact on international entrepreneurship (^{Dang, Bender, & Scotto, 2014}). In addition, female business leaders tend to be more risk-averse than males, which can hinder internationalization (^{Amorós et al., 2016}). This is particularly true in family firms, where females tend to adopt a more traditional, security-oriented role (^{Bianco, Ciavarella, & Signoretti, 2015}). Therefore, hypothesis 6 is proposed:

Independent board members can bring international knowledge to the companies, in addition to external experiences and managerial abilities that positively influence revenues and strategic orientation. Independent directors are able to reduce internationalization uncertainties, due to their industry and global experiences and expertise (^{Chen, Hsu, & Chang, 2016}). Compared with family board members, outside directors tend to be less risk-averse and more eager to internationalize (^{Herrera-Echaverri, Geleilate, & Gaitan-Riaño, 2016}). Independent board members pursue entrepreneurial objectives, without being directly involved in family issues or career progress concerns, which positively impacts internationalization efforts (^{Mitter, Duller, Feldbauer-Durstmüller, & Kraus, 2014}; ^{Min & Smyth, 2014}). As these board members are mainly aware of their reputation in directors´ labor markets, they look for profit-maximizing strategies, playing an active role in monitoring and advising top management and family entrepreneurs in order to succeed in international endeavors (^{Chen et al., 2016}). Independent directors face less resistance to change and can influence family entrepreneurs with growth and diversification ideas, including internationalization (^{Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006}). Therefore, hypothesis 7 will be tested:

Excessive family control can be detrimental for international entrepreneurship (^{Fernández & Nieto, 2005}). A combination of family and non-family board members is required in order to take advantage of outsiders’ resources, networks, knowledge and skills for the foreign expansion of family firms (^{Cerrato & Piva, 2012}). External directors can extend family entrepreneurs’ vision, in order to benefit from opportunities present in international markets (^{Ramón- Llorens et al., 2017}). In addition, greater inclusion of outsiders on the board of directors signals more professionalization and better corporate governance arrangements, which aid in complex decisions such as those related to international entrepreneurship (^{Rivas, 2012}). As such, hypothesis 8 is proposed:

3.1. Data

For this research, annual balanced data for 89 non-financial companies quoted in the Mexican Stock Market from 2001-2015 is considered. Financial and state-owned companies were excluded in the dataset, given the differences in their shareholding structure and the fact that their strategies are significantly affected by government regulations.

The data derives from a prior research project financed by CONACYT, the Mexican Council of Science and Technology. It is the first and only detailed corporate governance dataset constructed for companies listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores - BMV). The data compiled, referring to corporate governance, internationalization, and financial information, was obtained from companies’ annual reports, which are available online from BMV. These reports were complemented by an extensive search to identify the final controllers of each company and consequently determine its familial or non-familial nature.

Among other aspects, the following data was recorded: the name of the CEO; board members’ names, gender, and their participation as family, non-family or independent contributors; the top ten shareholders of the firm and their respective shareholdings; the education background of the CEO (Doctor of Philosophy - PhD, Master’s, Bachelor - BA, or no university studies); the university which awarded the highest degree obtained by the CEO and the title of the degree pursued (for those with university studies); the CEO’s number of years’ experience within the firm; total assets; stockhold-ers’ equity; net income; and presence of subsidiaries or branches in foreign markets.

The average ownership concentration of these firms is 54%. Following previous literature for Mexico (San Martín- Reyna & Durán-Encalada, 2012), in this study a family business is defined as such when a family owns at least 51% of the firm’s shares (52 companies fit this definition).

3.2. Variables

In accordance with the data compiled for Mexican listed family businesses, the following variables were constructed:

3.3. Methodology

The relationship between international entrepreneurship and CEO/board characteristics was empirically studied through a binary probit model. For this model, a significant positive (negative) sign on an independent variable’s parameter indicates that greater values of the variable increment (reduce) the odds of international entrepreneur-ship. Heteroscedasticity was taken into account by employing QML (Huber/White) robust standard errors. Marginal effects were obtained for all significant explanatory and control variables (p-value<0.01). Hence, the following equation was formulated:

(1)

Where i refers to the company; t is time; IE corresponds to the dependent variable: international entrepreneurship; FA, TE, IX, AB, and AA are the CEO attributes: family affiliation, tenure, international exposure, academic background, and academic achievement; GD, BI, and FN stand for the board diversity variables: gender diversity, board independency, and family vs. non-family board members; FS and ROE are the control variables: firm size and return on equity; and μ is a random error term.

4.1. Descriptive statistics

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the 780 observa-tions recorded for Mexican listed family firms. The correla-tions between the variables are shown in Table 2. Most of the explanatory and control variables correlate significantly with family businesses’ international entrepreneurship, measured by the dichotomous variable IE (being 1 if during a particular year the company had subsidiaries or branches in foreign markets). This finding validates the explanatory power of these variables on internationalization and justifies their inclusion in the model. The greatest correlations are between academic background (AB) and academic achievement (AA), and between academic achievement (AA) and international exposure (IX). However, in all cases the variance inflation factors are less than 10. The highest value is observed for AA (9.6), followed by IX (9.4); therefore, multicollinearity does not require any further treatment.

4.2. Econometric results

The econometric results of the relation between inter-national entrepreneurship and CEO/board traits of listed Mexican family businesses are presented in Table 3. Marginal effects for the significant explanatory and control variables (p-value<0.01) are shown in Table 4.

Results indicate low family-level international entrepre-neurship in Mexican listed companies. The probability of having subsidiaries or branches abroad declines 24% when the CEO is a family member and rises 6% with each 10% increment of non-controllers on the board. This finding suggests a family inclination towards security, stability, and tradition, counteracting firm-level IE behavior. This outcome contrasts evidence found for the U.K. and the U.S. (^{Wright et al., 2016}; ^{Zahra, 2003}), where it has been documented that the presence of a family-member CEO positively impacts innovation and IE.

In addition, the probability of IE increases 42% when the CEO majored in business administration. This education background favours strategic planning and management. It facilitates information processing, reduces risk aversion, provides a stronger international outlook, enables visionary thinking, and opens the way to innovation (^{Durán, Kammerlander, van Essen, & Zellweger, 2016}; ^{Christiansen, Joensen, & Rangvid, 2008}; ^{Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011}).

Results also indicate that a 1% increment in female representation on boards decreases the likelihood of IE by 2%. Previous research suggests that gender diversity on boards facilitates entrepreneurship. It has been argued that women on boards promote a more positive environment, extend discussions on strategic matters, increase human capital, and reduce conflicts (^{Wilson, Wright, & Scholes, 2013}; ^{Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009}). However, a recent paper (^{Sepúlveda & Bonilla, 2014}) employing APS surveys from the GEM project for several Latin American countries shows that fear of failure, and therefore risk aversion, is higher for women than men.

Regarding control variables, company size positively relates with the probability of IE, while ROE does not show a significant effect on IE likelihood.