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Praxis Filosófica
Print version ISSN 0120-4688
Abstract
ZULUAGA, Mauricio. The principle of logical closure of knowledge and skepticism. Prax. filos. [online]. 2012, n.35, pp.97-110. ISSN 0120-4688.
Current developments of modern skepticism have led to a resurgence of some of the problems presented by Descartes on the First Meditation. Within these developments are of particular concern, the Cartesian skepticism reconstructions supported on the principle of logical closure under implication of the concept known. These reconstructions allow Cartesian skepticism to clear ontological and metaphysical assumptions and also enable to observe certain continuity with the Pyrrhonian skepticism. The purpose of this paper is to provide a Cartesian skepticism reconstruction of First Meditation supported on the principle of logical closure and analyze its implications in the contemporary discussion.
Keywords : skepticism; modern skepticism; Descartes; pyrrhonism; principle of logical closure under known implication.