Abstract

SERRANO-LOPEZ, Miguel. Violence and corruption as maximization strategies in illegal markets: The case of coca. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2020, vol.39, n.81, pp.949-974. ISSN 0121-4772.  https://doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v39n81.56155.

This article describes the use of violence and corruption as profits maximizing factors for traffickers in the coca market. It is proposed that the condition of illegality results in the establishment of systems of private security and corruption that operate as strategies for maximizing the benefits of traffickers, and proposed the existence of an action of justice threshold that makes it unfeasible illegal activity in a specific production zone.

JEL: K420; D430; D210.

Keywords : Illegal behaviour; underground economy; monopsony; monopsonistic competition; firm behaviour.

        · abstract in Spanish | Portuguese     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )