Objective/Context:

In advanced democracies, political parties distribute their resources internally to make themselves stronger. Few studies examine the role of parties as intermediaries between campaign resources and candidates. Hence, we examine how political parties assigned campaign resources in 2014 election for federal deputies.

Methodology:

We tested the following hypothesis: resources from parties will be distributed to favor candidates holding office, at the expense of the party’s organizational structure. Our hypothesis is grounded on the personalistic trait surrounding Brazil’s political-electoral dynamics.

Conclusions:

Data indicates that parties assign their financial resources considering candidate’s individual electoral potential, at the expense of their organizational structure. Such a strategy reveals that the organizational structure of Brazilian parties is not related to the party’s strategy during elections.

Originality:

We show how often Brazilian political parties are “hijacked” by their elected representatives and, regardless of their organizational strength, party resources end up reinforcing the lack of competiveness and internal democracy within the organization.