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Papel Politico
Print version ISSN 0122-4409
Abstract
CASAS-CASAS, Andrés and HERRERA-TOLOZA, Germán. The Reparations Game : An Analytical Framework of Reparation in Transitional Justice. Pap.polit. [online]. 2008, vol.13, n.1, pp.197-226. ISSN 0122-4409.
The intention of this article is to stress the topic of reparations in processes of transitional justice from the perspective of political science. In a specific way, we intend to establish an analytical framework of reparations in the context of transitional justice in three levels: justice, administrative dimension and political dimension. Using the results of the review of different international cases and the tools of game theory, we present the ‘reparations game’ from a strategic perspective that copes with context and actors. Two strategies are outlined in order that the victims could overcome the constraints established by the previous political game that arises among government and wrongdoers. Finally we outline some conclusions and recommendations.
Keywords : Reparations; transitional justice; constraints; wrongdoers; victims; game theory; Polítical science; Conflict management; Justice and politics.