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Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas: Investigación y Reflexión
Print version ISSN 0121-6805
Abstract
RIASCOS CARABALI, Steven and CASTILLO VALENCIA, María del Pilar. Reckoning as a Mechanism to Correct Criminal Contracts. Rev.fac.cienc.econ. [online]. 2020, vol.28, n.1, pp.67-88. Epub Nov 24, 2020. ISSN 0121-6805. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.18359/rfce.4263.
This paper aims to model reckoning as the result of the interaction between the head of a criminal organization (principal) and his/her subordinate (agent) in a context of asymmetric information. Reckoning is shown to be a mechanism chosen by the principal to correct the agent's opportunistic behavior. This analysis allows understanding why fatal punishments are fundamental to maintaining order and obedience in the criminal world.
Keywords : reckoning; criminal alliances; criminal contract; agency theory; punishment; lethality.