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DYNA
Print version ISSN 0012-7353On-line version ISSN 2346-2183
Abstract
CRESPO, FERNANDO A. and PAREDES, RICARDO D.. A MECHANISM FOR EFFICIENT AND FAIR NIMBY LOCATION. Dyna rev.fac.nac.minas [online]. 2009, vol.76, n.160, pp.293-303. ISSN 0012-7353.
Whilst NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) are facilities necessary to society, are rejected for communities that host them. Thus, in contexts where bad compensation mechanisms exist, communities do not reveal the cost of hosting and social evaluation is severely limited. That explains why NIMBYs are finally located in base of corporate pressures, without technical criteria and with bias against the poorest localities. We propose decentralized mechanism to locate a NIMBY that I efficient (the NIMBY goes to the lowest cost location), and fair (all communities, including the host, are not worse off). The mechanism has balanced budget, and it fulfill the conditions of individual rationality.
Keywords : NIMBY; mechanism design, localization; auctions.