Abstract

RESTREPO, Medardo. Interest Groups and Environmental Regulation in Colombia: The Case of Hydric Resources. Lect. Econ. [online]. 2006, n.65, pp.143-176. ISSN 0120-2596.

Resorting to the menu auctions model developed by Grossman" Helpman (1994) and combining the interest groups models of Aidt (1997 and 1998), Fredriksson" Gaston (2000) and Becker (1983 and 1985) this article shows the effects that different interests have over the performance of the economic instrument (pollution tax) used in Colombia for the control of pollution in water bodies. Whenever differences exist among the influences of various interests different pollution levels will be obtained; which will be the best for the most influential groups but not so for society as a whole. Only when influences are balanced the resulting pollution levels will approach those socially efficient.

Keywords : environmental regulation; interest groups; menu auctions; common agency; pigouvian tax.

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