Abstract

HUANG, Xiang. LA EPISTEMOLOGÍA MÍNIMA SOCIAL DE PHILIP KITCHER Y SUS PROBLEMAS EN TORNO A LA METODOLOGÍA INDIVIDUALISTA?. Prax. filos. [online]. 2007, n.24, pp.45-68. ISSN 0120-4688.

The critiques of Philip Kitcher's social epistemology and theory of scientific practices have concentrated on his adoption of individualistic methodology. I try to show that, on the one hand, the purpose of Kitcher's adoption of individualistic methodology is searching for an adequate social epistemology; on the other hand, the problems come from two presumptions: a) there is a clear distinction between the internal (individual) and the external (social) aspects of epistemic processes; b) the epistemic norms as reason in an epistemic process have to be internal. I argue that, even if Kitcher's purpose of searching for an adequate social epistemology is correct, both presumptions are questionable, and that the reflection upon them suggest an alternative perspective for the investigation of social epistemology.

Keywords : social epistemology; individualistic methodology; space of reasons; scientific practices; rationality.

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