SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.31 issue1Formalism or a Third Way to Reconcile the Value of Written Law and Constitutionalism? An Example of the Constitutional Court of Hungary author indexsubject indexarticles search
Home Pagealphabetic serial listing  

Services on Demand

Journal

Article

Indicators

Related links

  • On index processCited by Google
  • Have no similar articlesSimilars in SciELO
  • On index processSimilars in Google

Share


Díkaion

Print version ISSN 0120-8942On-line version ISSN 2027-5366

Abstract

ALBERT, Richard; NAKASHIDZE, Malkhaz  and  OLCAY, Tarik. The Formalist Resistance to Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. Díkaion [online]. 2022, vol.31, n.1, pp.5-41.  Epub June 12, 2022. ISSN 0120-8942.  https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2022.31.1.1.

Many courts around the world have either asserted or exercised the power to invalidate a constitutional amendment. But we should not take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for all constitutional states. It is imperative that constitutional actors know that there is another answer to the question whether an amendment can be unconstitutional. We have three purposes in this Article, and we seek to fulfill each of them with reference to three jurisdictions in particular-France, Georgia, and Turkey-whose constitutions and attendant constitutional practices have expressly rejected the doctrine in a way that reflects what we describe as their shared formalist resistance to unconstitutional constitutional amendments. We seek first to demonstrate that the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment has not yet matured into a global norm of constitutionalism. We seek also to explain how a jurisdiction that expressly rejects the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment operates in the face of an amendment that would otherwise be invalidated as unconstitutional in a jurisdiction that has adopted the doctrine. We finally seek to evaluate what is gained and lost in a constitutional state by rejecting the doctrine. We find that there are both democracy-enhancing and democracy-weakening consequences that follow from the choice to reject the doctrine outright. Our larger purpose-to diversify our thinking about what risks becoming seen as a necessary feature of constitutionalism but that design and practice show plainly is not-is inherent in the project itself.

Keywords : Unconstitutional constitutional amendment; constitutional review; formalism; France; Georgia; Turkey.

        · abstract in Spanish | Portuguese     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )