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Discusiones Filosóficas

Print version ISSN 0124-6127

Abstract

GARCIA-DUQUE, Carlos Emilio. The concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. discus.filos [online]. 2019, vol.20, n.35, pp.31-43. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2019.20.35.3.

In this paper, I shall attempt a characterization of Smith’s concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. My goal is to show that Smith’s requirements of rationality (as inspired by Williams) cannot provide a good and workable account of what it means to be a fully rational agent. To this end, I shall examine Williams’ internalist requirement on reason and discuss the main shortcomings of such account of rationality. I shall try to show, also, that Smith’s and Williams’ views on rationality are too restrictive and thus cannot be applied to ordinary agents who deliberate in real life.

Keywords : The internalist requirement on reasons; rationality; practical sphere; Fully rational agent; Less than fully rational agent; Smith; Williams.

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