INTRODUCTION

Understanding argumentation is an important issue not only for lawyers and judges, but also for ordinary citizens who are concerned about the law's place in society. To this end, I undertake a theoretical analysis about argumentation. The research I present here is a further development of my master's dissertation in Law, conducted at the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The research received financial support from the Brazilian agency "Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível" (CAPES). The theoretical developments presented here aim to help illustrate and clarify argumentation by looking at basic argument construction methods and their main characteristics. I particularly consider the legal arguments of statutory interpretation.

To achieve that aim, this article explains what it means by argumentation, as its focus is on institutional argumentation, which gives a great importance to authority. The analysis is based on arguments that stem from one of the authoritative sources of law, namely legal texts and their interpretations, which can also be called arguments from statutory interpretation. Accordingly, I demonstrate some types of legal arguments and detail a few argumentation methods from legal interpretations, for it is necessary to present arguments to justify their interpretations. I represent the arguments in argument schemes and develop an account based on ^{Macagno and Walton (2017)}, focusing on arguments from the following perspectives: the purpose of legislation, avoiding absurd results, and the legislator's intentions.

Thus, I present a theoretical analysis based on the relevant literature to illustrate some of the main concepts needed for legal arguments of statutory interpretation. I take these concepts and elaborate on them through argument schemes that are used to demonstrate how one can argue in the legal field, albeit these schemes can also be useful for evaluating, reconstructing, and standardizing arguments. Overall, the process of reviewing argument schemes for legal arguments of statutory interpretation can increase our understanding of legal argumentation's main features and the interpretations necessary to effectively execute these arguments.

1. WHAT KIND OF ARGUMENTATION?

We can understand arguments as a series of connected statements, declarations, or propositions that support a conclusion or provide reasons to establish a conclusion. In other words, arguments always have something to prove. Argumentation involves exposing reasons to believe in a proposition, which may be in favor of or against something. As such, arguments can have different uses (^{Sinnot-Armstrong & Fogelin, 2014}), depending on the different contexts in which argumentation occurs. This research centers on the legal decisions of judges and their use of arguments to justify their decisions. In other words, this study is concerned with the reasons that justify a conclusion applied to the legal context. Other types include motivating and explanatory reasons, but these are not the focus of this study ( ^{Alvarez, 2018}).

Argumentation studies have contributed to highlighting two important types of arguments: (1) theoretical arguments, which try to prove or sustain that something is the case by providing reasons in favor of a descriptive proposition's veracity or falseness, and (2) practical arguments, which give reasons for actions, concerning whether or not one should do something (^{Shecaira & Struchiner, 2016a}). This differentiation is significantly relevant for legal decisions, because the context is often practical. However, this does not mean that only practical argumentation occurs in the legal field. For instance, the conclusion of a ruling or opinion indeed involves practical argumentation, as the result has practical effects on the lives of several people (e.g., if the defendant should be imprisoned, if a fine should be paid, etc.), but theoretical argumentation is used when arguing about facts. As such, judges' arguments revolve around practical reasons for doing or not doing something, but not all arguments presented in the legal decision-making process are practical.

Furthermore, practical argumentation can also be separated into two types: (1) substantive arguments, employing moral, political, economic, and social reasons; and (2) institutional arguments, reflecting the predominant argumentation in the legal field that cannot freely adapt considerations outside of the law, as these arguments are based on the rules of the related governing institutions (^{MacCormick, 1993}). The two types achieve conclusions based on different reasons and in different ways. Overall, most practical arguments have substantive characteristics because they are more commonly used by different agents in several contexts.

As a judge's legal argumentation is public, I follow ^{Bertea's (2017)} deductions that practical reasons are public, rational, and impersonal considerations. For conceptual clarity, I use the term legal argumentation, not legal reasoning. Although some authors use the terms interchangeably, 'reasoning' may involve an agent's internal process and not necessarily a public practice, which is the focus of this study. It is noteworthy to consider that judges' practical arguments bring forward justifying reasons for their conclusions. These reasons, which are practical and public, bind individuals to adhere to what has been rationally argued. However, such public and rational developments of practical reasons are not solely tied to legal argumentation. It is a standard applicable to all types of practical argumentation, because of the characteristics of practical reasons. It is also important to emphasize that judges should not take private considerations into account when deciding and arguing for their decisions (e.g., preferences, interests, and personal motives). Their decisions should be constructed on the grounds of what the law requires for a case in a rational and impersonal manner. For any individual who visualizes their arguments, the reasons for their conclusions should appear as guides for actions.

Moreover, several sources of law can argue for the justification of a legal decision. The status of such sources depends on the legal system and the field of law in question. For example, "in continental law systems, legal rules codified in statutes and treaties are legal sources that have, in principle, an authoritative status as argument in justifying a legal decision" (^{Feteris, 2017}, p. 8). This authoritative or compulsory status is a relevant feature of the law. A dominant characterization of authority indicates that its prescriptions are independent of their content (^{Hart, 1982}). In other words, its strength stems from who establishes the prescriptions and not from what these prescriptions establish.

Additionally, in everyday life, it is common to make decisions based on what we deem better or more appropriate, meaning that we decide based on substantial reasons. The same does not always occur in the legal field, where something may be done solely based on an authority's declaration. Thus, constructing arguments based on prescriptions of authority is an important aspect of the law. For instance, if a piece of valid and promulgated legislation declares that it is forbidden to cross the road beyond the limits of a crosswalk, for legal actors, this is a sufficient reason to justify always using the crosswalk and the state's enforcement of such a law, even if we may find substantial reasons to not follow it in our daily lives.

In other words, arguments stating that something must be done because a law so determined are adequate and reasonable for practical institutional argumentation. As another example, a prosecutor may argue that an individual committed a murder. As murder is a punishable act in the eyes of the law, the individual must be arrested. This argument, based on the authority of the law, compels the judge to arrest the individual. Although following authoritative sources is an important characteristic for legal decisions, other considerations can reject these sources. Evidently, this does not occur frequently, but sometimes, the literal meaning of the law is abandoned, or a precedent is overcome.

Overall, argumentation in the legal field places a high importance to authoritative sources. A mandatory source of law must always appear in a judicial decision, -even if this is not the only means by which a judge can present a legal argument. ^{Schauer (2009)} provided an example that captures this concept of authority: there is an important difference between learning to do something in a book and blindly following what a book says. The latter represents the law's authority. It requires no persuasion as to its merits, for it is the authority that must be "blindly followed." This is certainly an exaggeration that serves to demonstrate the concept of authority. In actuality, society should always view the law critically to guarantee justice.

Given the importance of authority in the legal arena, this article's development is based on arguments that come from one of the authoritative, immediate, and obligatory sources of law. These sources represent those that a judge must apply and cannot ignore. Accordingly, the presented arguments stem from legal texts and their interpretations, which can also be called arguments from statutory interpretation.

2. ARGUMENTATION AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

Arguments from statutory interpretation emerge through considerations of the existing legal text. In most legal systems, these texts are the primary sources of law (^{Huhn, 2014}). Nowadays, it is common to find a plethora of written legal provisions, even outside of the civil law systems, which are known for their extensive accumulation of written legislation. Moving from the text as a source of law to the clear formulation of a rule for a case is not always a simple task. A process of interpretation is often necessary and involves discerning the meaning of legal texts. It begins by examining the related legal texts in their literal sense, even if this does not always provide all the answers. From there, one must consider the different ways of approaching legal interpretations. This process can evidently result in different interpretations, which has caused numerous debates on the possibility of a single correct interpretation. Although ^{Dworkin (1986)} provided the most prominent inquiry into this possibility, his position does not seem to be dominant in the field of legal theory. What stands is that a choice must be made between the possible interpretations.

An interpretation depends on the context in which it is inserted. As such, interpreting a criminal law differs from interpreting an administrative law, due to the different contexts. The same applies to the roles that people play. Judges, lawyers, and prosecutors could interpret the same law in different ways. Thus, one should use some discretion when interpreting a legal text. As an interpretative choice must be made, an argument is required to justify the decision, but this process of interpreting statutes has one considerable limitation: the need for at least a minimal fidelity to the text being interpreted.

Within a legal text, there are different approaches that can count as an interpretation. The first form addressed here is "textualism," in which the interpreter must follow the simple and ordinary meaning of the words that make up a legislation, giving less weight or no weight at all to other forms of interpretation. This method can also be called formalist, as the text holds priority (^{Shecaira & Struchiner, 2016b}, p. 75). The language in legislation may express clear rules, such as "it is forbidden to drink alcoholic beverages under the age of 18," or set a standard, depending on the time, place, and circumstances in which it is read. One example of this is "being in the best interest of the child," applicable to cases of parental guardianship. Even though the cases may be different, the text always provides at least the starting point.

To interpret the text, it is necessary to use our common understanding of a language, not only dictionary definitions, as the dictionary's meaning may not reflect the intended contextual meaning. Although a law's related text is the most direct way to guide a judge's actions, the language of these texts does not always provide responses or can even offer inadequate responses, particularly when the language is ambiguous and/or indirect (e.g., "excessive," "unreasonable," or "best interest"). In these cases, the judge must look beyond the plain text, but that does not mean that the statutes offer no guidance. In this regard, ^{Hart's (1994)} example of a ban on vehicles in a park illustrates how legislation has established a core of meanings. Everyone would acknowledge that cars or trucks would represent vehicles for which such a ban is applicable. However, there are also penumbra cases, in which there are controversial applications. For example, would a skateboard or bicycle be forbidden in the park?

One way to solve such cases would be to interpret the rule based on the legislation's purpose or intention (teleological-subjective interpretation), but whether this purpose should be determined based on the legislation's history, the text itself, or a judge's recreated intention remains controversial. As there are many potential options, determining a correct procedure to define the purpose of a statute is still a debatable matter. For instance, if we consider the history approach, one would have to sift through several written documents and videos of debates that reveal what lawmakers believed or what committees understood when reviewing the law. Such an analysis is complex, because different legislators may present different reasons for a law's enactment. Therefore, it is difficult to determine a single purpose for a law and often necessary for the judge to construct the purpose, instead of trying to find it within the sources that promulgated the statute.

Another important point is that the purpose, as a general rule, should not triumph over textuality, except in absurd cases. Purposes are not always written or accessible, but the statute is, as well as its related history (^{Sustein, 2018}). Generally, these purposes are reconstructions, created by looking back at different sources, but a law can sometimes reveal its purpose in some of its provisions, such as, "this statute asserts the integral protection of children and adolescents." This process can be considered an intratextual interpretation, when one part of a legal text is used to interpret another (^{Huhn, 2014}, p. 25). Thus, as a statute's purpose is not always clear, it is necessary to evaluate the related pieces of legislation to construct a justified interpretation.

Regarding ^{Hart's (1994)} case, one could analyze the vehicle ban from the perspective of its purpose. For instance, if the law aims to protect pedestrians, bicycles could be banned. In this case, when the law's purpose is unclear, the judge would use discretion to decide the correct interpretation. Although it is clear that a pedestrian does not fit the vehicle prohibition rule and a truck does, other cases would require constructing arguments to permit or prohibit certain vehicles, such as skateboards and bicycles. These penumbra cases can be considered hard cases. They can occur based on linguistic indetermination, as with vehicles, or when the rule's literal provision can produce controversial or absurd results.

Such cases of absurd results are difficult, not because of the language's indeterminacy, but because the answer provided by the text is not desirable by social standards. For example, a law declares a 40km/h speed limit in the urban perimeter, with a fine penalty in case of disobedience. A young man passes the perimeter at 80km/h, because he is driving a person in a critical health condition. The practical context here justifies his actions. As a result, the law can be overruled, after a necessary presentation of arguments that clarify why applying the rule would be inadequate or undesirable. In other words, one should ensure that a statute's text does not end up generating an absurd result. In this case, punishing the young man is not desirable, despite the legal text's provisions, and the judge would use arguments to justify why the rule should not be applied. Overall, a legislation's language is not enough to provide all the answers for actual cases. It is indispensable that judges look at different sources of interpretation to achieve a result. Although the type of interpretations judges should appeal to is still disputed, I aim to present a few of options.

3. ARGUMENT SCHEMES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

As there is no exclusive way of formulating arguments that justify interpretations, argument schemes can be useful for demonstrating how one can present such arguments. Thus, this section aims to use these schemes to represent arguments of legislative or statutory interpretation. I develop an account based on ^{Macagno and Walton (2017)}, who listed generic categories of interpretative arguments that occur in law and offered schemes. They created this list based on other lists proposed by relevant scholars, such as ^{Tarello (1980)} and ^{MacCormick and Summers (1991)}. The interpretations I present, matching some of those on ^{Macagno and Walton's (2017)} list, aim to illustrate how one can formulate the arguments of interpretation discussed earlier.

Argument schemes can be defined as representations of argument types, which "are forms of argument (structures of inference) that represent structures of common types of arguments used in everyday discourse" (^{Walton et al., 2008}, p. 11). Such arguments develop from the semantic relations between the propositions involved, combined with a reasoning structure (e.g., deductive, inductive, abductive, etc.). Argument schemes can provide abstract argument representation patterns that can support or attack a conclusion or decision. These arguments do not suggest how judges should in fact argue. Rather, they exemplify argument types and evaluate the construction of different arguments. The following quote, represented in the form of a defeasible modus ponens, can serve as an example that demonstrates an argument scheme:

"If a sentence\term X has the property P, then X should (not) be given meaning M.

This sentence\term X has the property P.

Therefore, X should (not) be given meaning M" (^{Macagno & Walton, 2017}, p. 6).

This scheme uses a generic structure that interpretive arguments may employ. For clarity purposes, I insert the following fictitious example within the same scheme:

If "integral protection of children and adolescents" (term X) has the property of "generating an absurd result when understood in relative terms" (property P), then the phrase "integral protection of children and adolescents" (term X) must be given the meaning of "absolute, total, non-restrictive protection in relation to any other legally protected interest" (meaning M).

The phrase "integral protection of children and adolescents" (term X) has the property of "generating an absurd result when understood in relative terms" (property P).

Therefore, "integral protection of children and adolescents" (term X) must be given the meaning of "absolute, total, non-restrictive protection in relation to any other legally protected interest" (meaning M).

This argument only reflects a portion of a judge's entire decision. It would also be necessary to argue why the result would be absurd, but this part of the argument does not pertain to the legislation's interpretation per se, only to its outcome, which varies significantly based on context, and is, thus, beyond the scope of this analysis. It is possible to replace the scheme presented above with more particular ones, according to the intended interpretation, and this would provide a greater specificity to the interpretative argument. Thus, I will try to apply certain schemes to hypothetical cases and follow them as faithfully as possible. In legal practice, it may be more interesting to adapt and present the arguments according to the needs of textual coherence and cohesion.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper analyzed some legal arguments and found their most prominent characteristic to be their institutional nature, a feature that can be considered predominant in law. This implies following promulgated rules and standards, taking into account "the rules of the game." In other words, the law does not necessarily propose to achieve the best results in the cases it judges, although it avoids absurd results. Rather, it tries to offer as much treatment coherence as possible for different cases by providing a certain predictability. Thus, it is necessary for the judge to interpret a piece of legislation. As there are different ways of approaching this interpretation, the judge will have to choose between interpretive methods and employ some degree of discretion.

Moreover, an authoritative disposition must appear at some point in the argumentation: it must justify a judicial decision by referring to some mandatory sources of law. After understanding these authoritative dispositions, I aimed to provide some argument examples. The exemplification was established from one of the mandatory sources of law, the statutory interpretation, for it is commonly employed in different legal systems. I attempted to show some ways of approaching these law interpretations and turning them into arguments.

These demonstrations are not completely innovative, considering that Walton and Macagno's schemes were essential. However, there is always room for improvement, and schemes can be adapted to be more cohesive and better reflect their purposes. Although these schemes are not meant to be applied practically (i.e., to be followed by judges when making their decisions), they serve an important role in providing a theoretical depth to ensure that legal actors and citizens have the appropriate conceptual tools to evaluate or reconstruct the most diverse arguments put forward in the decisions of judges and courts.