Resumen

FLOREZ QUINTERO, Daian Tatiana. Does Scientific Realism require a comittment with the Correspondence Theory of Truth?. Prax. filos. [online]. 2012, n.34, pp.11-23. ISSN 0120-4688.

In this paper I intend to examine a thesis held by Devitt on the nature of scientific realism. In particular, I shall examine the thesis according to which no theory of truth is constitutive of realism, thus, a commitment with realism does not force us to subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth. If this thesis were right, all the antirealist attempts to refute the claims of scientific realism would be destined to fail since their objections suppose that one of the theories constitutive of realism is the correspondence theory of truth. My intuition is that it is not possible to emancipate scientific realism from its semantic commitments to a correspondence theory. In order to defend this point of view, I shall show how implausible is the thesis that a realist does not have to subscribe to a correspondence theory since he could adopt, instead, a redundancy theory of truth. My intuition is that if a realist subscribed to such theory he would not be able to successfully maintain the 'independence dimension' that according to Devitt is constitutive of Realism. Lastly, I shall show two undesirable results of maintaining a realism separate from semantics, among them that it is not clear how such a realist can respond to the problem of theory choice and that it is not possible to admit that there are causal relations between our minds and the world -like Devitt suggests- with no intrusions of semantics or without falling into antirealism.

Palabras clave : scientific realism; correspondence theory of truth; deflationary theory of truth; existence dimension; independence dimension.

        · resumen en Español     · texto en Español     · Español ( pdf )