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Praxis Filosófica
versión impresa ISSN 0120-4688versión On-line ISSN 2389-9387
Resumen
MORANDIN-AHUERMA, Fabio. The Value of the Moral Dilemmas for the Theory of Decision-Making. Prax. filos. [online]. 2020, n.50, pp.187-206. ISSN 0120-4688. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i50.8725.
This article analyzes the theory for decision making and contrasts the value of moral dilemmas to explain the deliberative mechanisms. It is argued that a successful decision strategy is one that is capable of performing the rational, adaptive and necessary movements to reach a programmed end. It suggests that the processes related to change and feedback can be useful but insufficient explanations if the theory of decisions is framed to deontological, utilitarian or emotional postures. The value of moral dilemmas and some recurrent criticisms are examined and it is concluded that, personal or impersonal, the dilemmas do not seem to explain the complexity of the deliberative processes.
Palabras clave : Decision-Making Theory; Moral Dilemmas; Moral Brain; Feedback; Trolley Dilemma.