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Eidos

versión impresa ISSN 1692-8857versión On-line ISSN 2011-7477

Resumen

RAHMAN, Shahid. Porque somos y no somos dioses: Leibniz, Descartes y Contralógicos. Eidos [online]. 2012, n.16, pp.12-38. ISSN 1692-8857.

The main aim of the present paper is to understand the debate between Descartes and Leibniz about eternal truths as providing the structure of several possible dialogues involving counter-logicals conditionals. According to this analysis the positions of Descartes and Leibniz are understood as constituting dual and dynamic perspectives in relation to the availability of some specific choices that should provide norms of rationality. Each of these dialogues has both a universal, monological aspect (given by the winning strategy) and a contextual, dialogical one (given by the play level). I conclude with the suggestion that a notion of rationality that contains both the universal and the contextual aspects does not yield a specific logic, but rather a frame of normative rationality. The conception of such a frame seems to be closely linked to the notion of a universal perfectible language discussed by Olga Pombo. The central idea is that the Leibniz's notion of rationality is a fondateur de discursivité if we use Marcelo Dascal's quote of Foucault.

Palabras clave : Eternal truths; counter-logical conditionals; universal language; rationality; "fondateur de discursivité".

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