SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
 número40Alejandro de Afrodisia intérprete del De anima de AristótelesEl aristotelismo de Alejandro de Afrodisia en la cultura del comentario índice de autoresíndice de materiabúsqueda de artículos
Home Pagelista alfabética de revistas  

Servicios Personalizados

Revista

Articulo

Indicadores

Links relacionados

  • En proceso de indezaciónCitado por Google
  • No hay articulos similaresSimilares en SciELO
  • En proceso de indezaciónSimilares en Google

Compartir


Estudios de Filosofía

versión impresa ISSN 0121-3628

Resumen

BOERI, Marcelo D. Alexander of Aphrodisias as an interpreter of the Aristotelian noetics. Estud.filos [online]. 2009, n.40, pp.79-107. ISSN 0121-3628.

this essay intends to show that, despite the relevance of Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle's agent intellect (the intellect that Alexander indentifies with god), such an interpretation cannot be right due to reasons of systematic order that go against some basic Aristotelian premisses, both ontological in general and noetical and psychological in particular. In the development of his essay, Boeri highlights some arguments and explanations provided by Pseudo Philoponus, who (rightly according to him) is concerned with encompassing the issue of the intellect on the psychological side, which presupposes that the intellect must have a bodily support. A consequence of this examination, Boeri suggests (i) that not only Alexander's interpretation of intellect does not constitute a correct exegesis of Aristotle's De anima III 5, but that (ii), when identifying the agent intellect with the intellect "coming from without", with god, and with the first cause, Alexander introduces an important incoherence within his own psychological conception, which acknowledges Aristotle's thesis that the psychological states "exist" through the body.

Palabras clave : Aristotle; Alexander; psychology; noethics.

        · resumen en Español     · texto en Español     · Español ( pdf )

 

Creative Commons License Todo el contenido de esta revista, excepto dónde está identificado, está bajo una Licencia Creative Commons