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Colombia Internacional

versión impresa ISSN 0121-5612

Resumen

MEJIA GUINAND, Luis Bernardo; BOTERO, Felipe  y  RODRIGUEZ RAGA, Juan Carlos. Paving Roads with Votes?: Budgetary Allocations for Road Infrastructure Projects in Colombia, 2002-2006. colomb.int. [online]. 2008, n.68, pp.14-42. ISSN 0121-5612.

This article inquires about the factors that explain budgetary allocations for road infrastructure during the first Uribe administration. Concretely, the analysis contrasts the importance of technical and political criteria in budgetary decisions. The evidence suggests that some political criteria have predominance and that technical criteria have no incidence in the definition of investment on road infrastructure. For our analysis, we created an original data set which allows us to conclude that investment decisions on roads does not respond to the social welfare function and the development model that the administration defined in its own strategic planning. Furthermore, the evidence suggests an effective schism between the administration’s technical advisors and the implementation of its policies. The data shows a positive relationship between spending on roads and holding Consejos Comunales. This finding supports the hypothesis that spending on road infrastructure is a populist measure given that those municipalities in which Consejos Comunales met received an additional $14.1 million vis-à-vis municipalities without such meetings. In the Consejos Comunales the administration commits resources allowing it to secure political support needed to stay in power. Moreover, we conclude that the administration spends more in municipalities whose mayor does not belong to the government coalition, indicating that the use of budgetary priorization as a way to buy political support in those municipalities where it was defeated in the local elections. The municipalities where the coalition won received $2.6 million less in funding than those ruled by mayors of its coalition.

Palabras clave : budget; road infrastructure; technical criteria; clientelism; populism.

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