Resumo

PEREIRA GANDARILLAS, FRANCISCO. HUME AND THE FICTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. Ideas y Valores [online]. 2014, vol.63, n.154, pp.191-213. ISSN 0120-0062.  https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v63n154.31448.

The standard interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it is only a bundle of perceptions. The article argues that both of those statements are false. Accepting them would commit Hume to a form of epistemic and metaphysical dogmatism that is incompatible with his experimental philosophy.

Palavras-chave : D. Hume; personal identity; mind.

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