Resumo

STEPANENKO GUTIERREZ, Pedro. Nonconceptual Contents in Kant´s Philosophy. Prax. filos. [online]. 2016, n.43, pp.225-242. ISSN 0120-4688.

The aim of this paper is to compare two ways of understanding the difference between intuitions and concepts in order to inquire whether it make sense to talk of nonconceptual content in Kant's philosophy. These two ways of understanding this difference is the one Efraín Lazos supports in his 2014 book (pp. 19-60) and mine in several publications (2000, 2008, 2011, 2012). According to Lazos, kantian intuitions have nonconceptual content. According to me, kantian intuitions represent something or have content only when they are synthesized by means of concepts and in that sense their content is always conceptual

Palavras-chave : intuitions; concepts; mental content; Kant's theoretical philosophy; conceptual synthesis.

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