Resumo

METTINI, María Guadalupe. Thought Experiments and a priori Knowledge. Prax. filos. [online]. 2018, n.47, pp.71-90. ISSN 0120-4688.  https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i47.6599.

Although physicists have constantly used thought experiments, at least since the days of Galileo, the classical philosophers of science only recognized them purely heuristic -or, at most, critical- functions. However, some authors have defended the legitimacy of its use in the context of justification. In this vein, James Robert Brown argues for the thesis that the type of phenomenon that occurs in the so-called "Platonic thought experiments", provides a priori knowledge of the laws of nature. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate this perspective. It will attempt to show that the arguments to support the thesis of a priori knowledge in thought experiments has serious flaws and do not present sufficient reason to assume the metaphysical commitments to which it is linked.

Palavras-chave : thought experiments; a priori knowledge; laws of nature; phenomenon; evidence.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )