Resumo

ALVARADO MARAMBIO, José Tomás. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ONTOLOGY OF PERSON. Univ. philos. [online]. 2016, vol.33, n.66, pp.77-112. ISSN 0120-5323.  https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.uph33-66.ipop.

It is argued here that it is part of our concept of a 'person' that persons should be, by its nature, able to endure in time. In no conception of persons as 'perduring' entities with different temporal parts for different times, or as sequences of stages in the relation of 'being a survival of' between them, it is possible to make sense of some of our normative intuitions about persons. It is argued also that the traditional psychological theory of personal identity is untenable. Psychological continuity appears to be neither sufficient nor necessary for personal identity. A reasonable conception of persons seems to be either a form of 'animalism' where persons are biological organisms, or a theory in which persons are primitive substances, with primitive conditions of identity.

Palavras-chave : identity; ontology; person; psychological continuity; entity.

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