Resumo

FERGUSSON, Leopoldo. Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2019, vol.38, n.spe78, pp.671-700.  Epub 15-Dez-2019. ISSN 0121-4772.  https://doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v38n78.71224.

I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a "public goods trap" rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism.

JEL: D72, D73, D74, H26, H41, H42, O43.

Palavras-chave : Conflict; state capacity; public goods; political economy.

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