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Discusiones Filosóficas

versão impressa ISSN 0124-6127

Resumo

SIERRA, Jorge. Are the evolutionary debunking arguments of memetics againts the rationality of theism valid?. discus.filos [online]. 2015, vol.16, n.27, pp.87-103. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2015.16.27.6.

The aim of this paper is to answer the question of whether the two evolutionary debunking arguments (EDA) which, in my interpretation, can be developed from memetics (the argument of contagion and the argument of belief in belief) successfully undermine both the internalist and the externalist rationality of theism. The EDA against the rationality of religious belief try to prove that if such belief is caused by processes that do not track the truth, then this belief is unwarranted or even false. I will argue that the contagion argument is not valid due to the theoretical weakness of memetics, while the argument of belief in belief may be partly valid, since it is logically independent of the memetic approach. Finally, I will examine a possible refutation of that argument based on the thesis that the propositional belief in God is not decisive for the adaptive explanation of the complex system of religion. I will show, briefly, that this does not save theism from another EDA based on the adaptive nature of religion.

Palavras-chave : evolutionary debunking arguments; theism; atheism; Dennett; rationality.

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