Resumo

VILATTA, Emilia. Belief ascription and irrationality: The case of delusions. discus.filos [online]. 2021, vol.22, n.39, pp.15-34.  Epub 08-Mar-2022. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2021.22.39.2.

In this paper I will focus on the discussion about the possibility to ascribe the status of beliefs to delusions, considering that there is a conceptual tension between the requirement of rationality for belief ascription and the irrationality that delusions exhibit. For this purpose, I will analyse what I call as the “irrationality argument” in the two variants that I identify: the transcendental variant and the empirical variant. Against this argument, I will show that, despite the irrationality that delusional states exhibit, we can continue ascribing to such states the status of beliefs.

Palavras-chave : Delusions; beliefs; rationality; intentional ascription.

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