Resumo

ALVARADO MARAMBIO, José Tomás. Second-Order Necessitism. Eidos [online]. 2017, n.26, pp.268-301. ISSN 1692-8857.

Abstract In a series of writings Timothy Williamson has argued for necessitism (cf. Williamson, 1978/9, 1990, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2010, 2013, forthcoming "Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic"), i. e. the thesis that it is necessary that everything exists necessarily. This work discusses second-order necessitism, i. e. the thesis that it is necessary that every property exists necessarily, considering lines of argument similar to those displayed on first-order. Three of those arguments are examined. (i) the necessary character ofbeing a property, (ii) the occurrence of properties in propositions, and (iii) the ontological commitments of the metalanguage where the semantics is formulated. It is argued that none of them are compelling. The justification for second-order necessitism seems to require more substantive metaphysics than formal results, at least if the formal results in view are those discussed here.

Palavras-chave : Necessitism; contingentism; modality; properties; second-order logic.

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