Resumo

NAKANO, Hirotaka. The First Half of the Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B). Ideas y Valores [online]. 2008, vol.57, n.137, pp.93-112. ISSN 0120-0062.

After the publication of Strawson's "The Bounds of Sense", the Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been widely regarded as a proof of the objectivity of knowledge as a condition of unity of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, many interpreters accept that there are passages which cannot be easily integrated into such a strategy. In this article, through an analysis of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction (B), I try to point out the need to adopt a different interpretation according to which Kant does not consider objectivity as a condition of self-consciousness, but rather self-consciousness as a necessary condition of objectivity.

Palavras-chave : Transcendental Deduction; Kant; objectivity; self-consciousness.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )