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Ideas y Valores

versão impressa ISSN 0120-0062

Resumo

FRANKFURT, HARRY. Inadvertence and Moral Responsibility. Ideas y Valores [online]. 2009, vol.58, n.141, pp.11-24. ISSN 0120-0062.

Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently. I consider what response we might reasonably expect from a person who inadvertently does or brings about some event or condition that is manifestly undesirable or bad; and I suggest that we might reasonably expect such a person not to feel guilty but, rather, to feel embarrassed by his or her inability to prevent or avoid that condition or event.

Palavras-chave : Thomas Nagel; moral luck; moral responsibility; guilt; embarrassment.

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