Resumo

RODRIGUEZ TELLEZ, Diego  e  ZULUAGA CARDONA, Mauricio. Against the naturalness of skepticism about the external world: Wittgenstein and epistemological realism. Estud.filos [online]. 2023, n.67, pp.65-87.  Epub 24-Jan-2023. ISSN 0121-3628.  https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.349444.

The purpose of the paper is to cast doubt on the alleged intuitive or natural character of the skeptical argument about the external world. In §1, we examine a version of the skeptical argument based on the epistemic closure principle and the indifference principle. In §2, in order to deepen the view defended by Michael Williams, we offer a novel examination of the Cartesian skeptical argumentation to show that it is clear that the alleged naturalness claimed by the skeptic is nowhere to be found in two arguments which can be found in such argumentative strategy; moreover, to reach her conclusion, the skeptic needs to commit to epistemological realism, namely, the claim that each of our beliefs belongs to an epistemological hierarchy based solely on its content. In §3, based on arguments inspired by Wittgenstein, contra epistemological realism, we show how each belief has a justificatory role based on its context.

Palavras-chave : skepticism; skeptical hypothesis; epistemological realism; doubt; Wittgenstein.

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