Introduction

China has become a leading force in global politics; the predominant measures for this, however, tend to be the size and growth of the country’s economy, the scale of its overseas investments and commercial relationships, or the relative capabilities of its military forces. Another crucial measure of China’s global reach is the extension of its diplomatic network. Chinese and foreign media alike invariably underscore the centrality of the Beijing government and the Communist Party (often interchangeably) in China’s domestic affairs. Nevertheless, when it comes to the country’s activities overseas, the focus shifts to state-owned corporations and, more recently, to organizations such as the United Front Work Department or the “hidden agendas” of educational institutions such as the Confucius Institutes and academic exchange programs. Considering that China’s government strategy and messaging are carefully crafted centrally, both at home and abroad, the highly visible impact of Chinese corporations on the international stage must be understood alongside the activities of Beijing’s official emissaries-the diplomatic corps.

For decades, Washington had the most extensive diplomatic network in the world. However, as its size, scope, influence, and morale have steadily declined during the Trump administration and failed to recover under President Biden due to congressional roadblocks (^{Burns 2019}; ^{Feinberg 2022}), the dynamics of influencing global affairs have shifted: according to a recent study by the Lowy Institute in Sydney, it is now the People’s Republic of China that has the numerical lead, boasting 276 diplomatic posts-including embassies, consulates, and permanent missions to international organizations (Lowy Institute 2019). Moreover, the number of embassy staff has risen, their average age has decreased, and professional training and internal knowledge transfer are being enhanced across the board (Wang and Li 2017).

This development is due to the recognition by Beijing that China’s rise as a major stakeholder and the expanding presence of its corporations and citizens worldwide have put growing demands on its diplomatic service. The role and abilities of Chinese diplomats as representatives, communicators, and negotiators on behalf of their government are increasingly tested, in many cases, by less-than-sympathetic foreign publics and governments. Over the past ten years, the Chinese government has become aware of these challenges and has sought to restructure and strengthen its foreign service in multiple ways. There is still much room for improvement to keep up with the rapid growth of the country’s overall strength: in terms of diplomatic personnel relative to its population, or expenditure as a percentage of gross national product, China still lags the United States and Japan by a large margin (^{Doherty 2019}; Wang 2016).

A case that illustrates this tendency and its continuing challenges is the region of Latin America. As the most distant frontier in China’s “Going Abroad” strategy,² it has experienced the impact of China’s dramatic economic growth only since the beginning of this century: an exponential growth in bilateral trade, a rapid rise of mergers and acquisitions by Chinese corporations, billions of dollars in loans, and a wide range of cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges. Official visits to the region by China’s top leadership have increased to become a near-annual event between 2008 and 2019, and forums for high-level multilateral cooperation have bloomed. This multidimensional trend (^{Shen and Blanchard 2010}) has been supported by a growing and increasingly versatile body of diplomats on the field, who have gained considerable visibility in the process.

The central question this article addresses is: How has Chinese foreign diplomatic engagement in Latin America evolved to keep pace with the country’s goals, and how effectively are Chinese envoys to the region able to establish and maintain the demands and priorities of their government? A subsidiary question is: How free are they in the form and modalities of their engagement? By tracking the careers and movements of Chinese diplomats across Latin America since 1990, we can identify trajectories and patterns of engagement that illuminate Beijing’s drive to enhance the pursuit of its domestic and international goals. By profiling some of its emissaries against the background of China’s broader approach to the region, a picture emerges of a varied and increasingly refined diplomatic strategy (Liu 2001). The evidence shows how China’s diplomats, despite their internal hierarchies, have embraced network diplomacy (^{Heine 2013}) and are working self-consciously and with considerable latitude to improve their cross-cultural communication.

Since 2018, media in the US and several European countries have highlighted a particular aspect of Chinese diplomacy: the phenomenon of “Wolf Warrior” diplomats (^{McDonell 2021}). The term was derived from a 2017 motion picture of the same title (Wu 2017) and has been used to describe assertive Chinese diplomats who use provocative language on social media and shout at or insult foreign counterparts (^{Martin 2021})-behavior previously considered acceptable only from representatives of some Western powers. This emphasis sits well with the US strategy of pushing back against a rising China but is also misleading as it is not statistically representative.

Finally, the paper acknowledges the changing dynamics of the organizations involved in China’s overseas operations: the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, the Development and Reform Commission, and organizations within the Chinese Communist Party, such as the Central International Liaison Department and the United Front Work Department. This offers a basis for further contributions to the heated debate about China’s likely forward trajectory as a responsible stakeholder, a spoiler, or a free-rider in the global system (^{Kastner, Pearson, and Rector 2018}). It suggests that even as China abides by the most existing rules and institutions (^{Heilmann et al. 2014}), the country is increasingly punching its weight in the realization of its own goals and is more willing to take reputational risks in that pursuit.

1. The Politics of China’s Overseas Work in the Twenty-First Century

Modern Chinese diplomacy emanates from the phrase “外交无小事，大权在中央” (In foreign affairs, there is no small matter, and the power resides in the center), widely attributed to the supreme diplomat of the early People’s Republic, Premier Zhou Enlai. It recognizes the importance of consistency in messaging and the value the Communist Party attaches to central control. In practice, this means that junior diplomats and early-career ambassadors typically spend long stretches at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) or the International Liaison Office of the Communist Party’s Central Committee (IDCPC) in Beijing. That said, China’s diplomacy has long been dominated by “economic diplomacy.” As Pang Zhongying has pointed out, this is only gradually shifting: until quite recently, Beijing’s overriding goal was to keep a low profile and emphasize a neutral “non-intervention” policy (2009).

However, following the 18^th National Party Congress in November 2012 and the instalment of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Communist Party, President of the People’s Republic, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, we witnessed several important innovations in the country’s diplomacy, under the headline of 中国特色的大国外交 [Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics] (Chen 2014, 39)-a motto at once grand and somewhat vague, but not meaningless. It translates into giving greater prominence to diplomacy in China’s global projection, an incremental prioritization of national interests, and the pursuit of heightened influence in world affairs. In practice, it called on Chinese diplomats not only to maintain ongoing dialogues with foreign governments and deal with external crises and challenges but to ensure a peaceful and stable external environment for China’s development and actively participate in the shaping of this environment in a strategic manner-an ambitious goal best summed up using the concept of Sinicization coined by Peter ^{Katzenstein (2012)} : making the world a more amenable space and more suitable the center. We may think of this as a more subtle and less invasive variation of the British introducing their own educational and administrative institutions to their colonies.³ Beyond a shift in practice, this outlook further implies that China is willing to assume more “great power responsibilities”⁴ and aims to push back against the Pivot to Asia strategy presented by US President Barack Obama in 2012 (Chen 2015).

The increasing diversification of China’s overseas activities-including especially a growing protagonism of non-government actors such as Chinese multinationals that came with the country’s opening-up policy in the 1980s and the Going Out campaign of the late 1990s-brought with it difficulties in the central coordination of foreign policy and ensuring national priorities and desired outcomes. Therefore, incoming Party and government leader Xi Jinping urged major institutional reforms in foreign affairs and diplomacy to strengthen overall planning and coordination. The administration restructured border and maritime enforcement agencies, began to establish a unified coast guard, and created the Central National Security Council with Xi as its chairman. Following a carefully crafted publicity campaign celebrating the 16th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence formulated at the 1954 Bandung Conference, China’s diplomatic propaganda machine moved gradually away from former leader Deng Xiaoping’s approach of “maintaining a low profile and biding one’s time” (韬光养晦) towards a focus on “taking initiative and being enterprising” (主动进取). Chen Zhimin explains that China strove to achieve a progressive and proactive diplomacy: Beijing has encouraged its overseas to actively participate in shaping the external environment and consciously resolve or hedge foreign challenges from the source (2014, 40). To this end, the new government developed a fresh diplomatic discourse around ideas such as the “Chinese dream,” great power diplomacy, and the BRICS cooperation mechanism. Diplomacy is to be governed by the four themes of “friendship, good faith, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness” (亲诚惠容) within President Xi’s trademark notion of a “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” and the more tangible frameworks of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Road.

China’s structural emphasis on bilateral diplomacy and, specifically, on partnership diplomacy has been well documented (Feng and Huang 2014, cf. also Beck, Muller, and Seabra 2020). Nevertheless, beyond that, Chen emphasizes how this has translated into diplomatic practice: partnership diplomacy strategically uses personal connections and network diplomacy to further differentiate relations with individual states, aiming to shift relationships with some countries and regions under a central direction. For countries that challenge China’s principal interests, diplomats are encouraged to take the initiative to cool down relations and reduce perceived proximity (Chen 2014, 41). So, while the recent phenomenon of China’s “Wolf Warrior diplomats” may be in part an expression of individual preferences, it is also more likely an intentional “bark” encouraged centrally than a series of diplomatic faux-pas (Xiang 2020; ^{Martin 2019}). It is what former Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Ying referred to when she warned that a country’s discursive power to influence ideas and values of others depends on the coherence and sincerity of its public discourse-and, by extension, on the coherence and sincerity of its public representatives on the global stage (Fu 2020). We now turn to Latin America to explore what changes in the structure and goals, discourse, style, and formation of China’s foreign service might mean in practice.

2. The Case of Latin America

As noted above, Latin America was the last region to develop a significant and dynamic relationship with China. Some observers make the case that the People’s Republic had not historically attempted “to construct either an ideologically driven or geopolitically purposeful strategy in Latin America” (^{Phillips 2010, 179}). Given Latin American socialist experiments over the past century and the recurrence of certain revolutionary movements of Maoist thought and guerrilla tactics,⁵ it is tempting to identify patterns and direct connections, but these tend to be misleading.⁶ The nature of this relationship, comparatively unburdened by history, is why a study of contemporary China’s diplomatic strategy and activities in Latin America offers a fresh and instructive spotlight on how China views its role and future path in the world. The fast pace of this development over the past two decades and its dynamism-frequently referred to by Chinese scholars in terms of “gigantic leaps” or “leapfrog progress” -makes an informed analysis of this relationship particularly relevant (^{Creutzfeldt 2012}).

After establishing diplomatic missions in most major countries of the region in the 1970s, the People’s Republic adopted a practical approach to this transpacific rapprochement that began in 1980 with an agreement with Mexico. It sent over a hundred young officials to Mexico to learn Spanish and become more attuned to Latin American cultures and realities. Several of them were later selected to become diplomatic representatives to the region (^{Harris 2007, 7}). Beyond that, China committed funds for training, education, and research on Latin America, principally through the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Central Party School. This focus has been incremental and consistent: both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping recognized the importance of improving knowledge of world regions and financed initiatives to expand the discipline of Area Studies in China (Ren and Liu 2020). Since 2010, successive government policies have supported the development of increasingly high-quality Latin American and other area studies centers across the People’s Republic, not only to research and teach but as a targeted effort to inform China’s foreign policy-making and diplomatic corps. China now boasts as many as sixty centers focused on the Latin American region alone, aimed at better understanding the chronic challenges of Latin American economies and societies (^{Myers, Barrios, and Guo 2018}).

It is this informed consolidation of goodwill and enhanced dovetailing of mutual interests that led Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary of ECLAC, to state in October 2021 that “cooperation between China and Latin America and the Caribbean offers an opportunity to reduce global asymmetries and support a transformative, inclusive economic recovery that promotes sustainable development” (CEPAL 2021). Most Latin American governments have begun to recognize Chinese expertise in building roads, railways, ports, and energy plants-undeniable necessities for economic and social progress. They have understood that China is at the forefront globally in renewable energy sources, industry guidelines for sustainable development, and many cutting-edge technologies. The Chinese also came through as highly visible helpers in the COVID-19 pandemic when they delivered at least 130 million dollars’ worth of face masks (Telias and Urdiñez 2020) and shipped vast quantities of vaccines to the region, breaking the crest of several waves of infection.⁷

Of course, China’s interest in the region is driven primarily by sharply growing trade and investment flows and is illustrated by the number of top leadership visits. The first Chinese premier to travel to Latin America was Zhao Ziyang in 1985, followed by Li Peng in the early 1990s. Since 2004, however, high-profile visits have been more frequent and increased even to become an annual event after the publication of China’s first Policy Paper for the region in November 2008. Regarding the choice of countries visited by successive leaders (Hu Jintao and Wen ^{Jiabao until 2012}, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang since then), no pattern is discernible in terms of political leanings or investment priorities, though, inevitably, international summits such as BRICS in Brazil, APEC in Peru, and the China-CELAC Forum in Chile determined preferences and afforded the visits greater prominence in the media. As bilateral visits and exchanges at all levels increased, so did the desire to offer concrete plans: during his visit to Latin America in July 2014, President Xi put forward a “1+3+6” cooperation framework-one plan with three engines in six areas. The plan was envisioned as a five-year Cooperation Plan between China and the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The three engines were to place trade, investment, and financial cooperation as driving forces to ensure a comprehensive development of transpacific cooperation with the goal of achieving a trade balance of US$500 billion within ten years and aiming for Chinese investment in the region of US$250 billion. The focus was to be on six major areas: energy resources, infrastructure design, agriculture, manufacturing, technological innovation, and information technology. These formal frameworks set the agenda for bilateral and multilateral meetings and lend themselves to some analysis; they fail, however, to capture the strengths, weaknesses, or real prospects of China’s engagement with the countries of Latin America. This is where tracing the careers and movements of Chinese diplomats across the region can be a tool to help illuminate Beijing’s drive to enhance its pursuit of domestic and international goals.

3. Methodology

My research over the past several years shows that although economies with larger populations and markets (principally Brazil and Mexico) or rich natural resources (primarily Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil) have naturally loomed larger on Beijing’s list of priorities, the experience, style, and ability of diplomats on either side also seem to have had a discernible impact on outcomes. For instance, Beijing’s conspicuously significant commitment to Venezuela in the shape of successive billion-dollar loans-for-oil coincided with the ten-year ambassadorial posting to Beijing of Rocío del Valle Maneiro González, as well as a series of seasoned diplomats from the Chinese side. Inversely, the lack of activity on any front between neighboring Colombia and the People’s Republic until 2018 coincided with the presence of rather reserved and soft-spoken Chinese emissaries who kept a low profile in the national conversation. I gathered data on over eighty Chinese ambassadors posted to the twelve principal capitals of Latin America and the Caribbean since 1990 and ascribed point values to each based on their career trajectory, experience, and diplomatic ranks at the time of each successive posting. In cooperation with a former Chinese diplomat to Mexico, I fine-tuned relative values for each individual as they rose through the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 3^rd or 2^nd Secretary to 1^st Secretary, Minister Counsellor, and Ambassador, and what rank they held while ambassador (if any), ranging from Deputy General Director and General Director up to Under Secretary. For each professional profile, I created an individual file, noting the sequence of postings and successive roles between various ministerial departments and embassies and compiling published articles and interviews granted, along with media reports and social media posts in the host countries.

What is evident is a high level of regional specialization by Chinese ambassadors, to a degree comparable to the United States foreign service, but not seen in the Latin American postings of other major economies: the vast majority of top diplomats from countries such as Germany, France, the UK, and Japan have wide-ranging experience the world over but are rarely posted more than once to the region. The regional specialization is expressed in consistently rising point values as careers have crisscrossed the continent.⁸ Postings in the positions of Secretary are typically between two and three years, while an ambassador remains in one position for a little over three years on average. Almost every posting abroad is preceded by at least two years of working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), usually within the Department of Latin American Affairs. Only the ambassadors to Brazil and Mexico routinely carry the high rank of Under-Secretary within the MoFA. Linking the seniority of individuals to specific countries on a map (see Figure 1) suggests that the ambassadors to certain countries are consistently more senior: the figures for Brazil are the highest, followed by Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina. Given that Brazil is also the most populous country and the largest economy in the region-and it is followed by the three countries named in both parameters-this would suggest a purposeful correlation in terms of strategic priorities, much as can be found in the selection of diplomatic envoys of other major countries.

Source: own elaboration based on data gathered by the author.

Figure 1. Cumulative points per country (1990-2020) for Chinese ambassador ranks 

It should be noted, of course, that outside of Latin America, too, Chinese diplomats have made critical connections with Latin American counterparts in Washington, DC: the Hall of the Americas at the Organization of American States, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and other regional forums (^{Myers 2020}). China is keenly aware that the debates within these institutions, even on internal policy, shed light on the countries’ policy priorities and diplomatic dispositions while enabling them to gain insights into regional dynamics and individual country priorities, goals, and needs.

4. Changing Tendencies over Time

Such strategic and well-informed engagement with other countries was not a feature of earlier generations of Chinese diplomats. In her book, Liu ^{Xiaohong (2001)} explored the evolution of Chinese diplomats from the foundation of the PRC in 1949 up until the 1990s. Leaning on Max Weber’s notion of charisma, Liu argued convincingly that each generation is deeply marked by the human factor, considering this relevant for understanding the relationship of diplomats with their compatriots and the local population in the country of their posting, and also the impact of charismatic national leaders-starting with Chairman Mao. Liu showed how Chinese ambassadors transformed from the ideologically-driven, militaristic ambassadors of the 1950s to more cosmopolitan and experienced diplomats of the 1990s. This transformation signaled a gradual professionalization of China’s foreign service, reflecting both the nation’s rise on the world stage and changes in China’s internal political environment.

The professionalization, Liu explained, could be tracked through four generations of Chinese diplomats, each with their own distinct characteristics. The first generation, from 1949 to 1954, was represented by 17 ambassadors, most recruited from the military. While they stood out for their loyalty to Chairman Mao and for leadership in the Revolution, they lacked education and foreign experience. The second group, from 1954 to 1966, comprised 77 ambassadors as China expanded its diplomatic relations. These ambassadors were more educated and experienced than the previous cohort and recruited from the military, provincial governments, and universities. This generation also saw the increasing institutionalization of Chinese diplomacy, with the formation of a supporting interpreter system and Zhou Enlai’s “3-3-3 system” (1/3 of diplomats in Beijing, 1/3 in embassies, 1/3 in personnel reserves) to ensure both foreign and domestic training. The third generation of diplomats, from 1966 to 1984, represented a transitional generation between the political appointees of the second generation and the career diplomats of the fourth. Although many of these 179 ambassadors started out in non-diplomatic careers, the majority had accumulated experience in foreign affairs by the time of their appointment. In fact, despite the banishment of several experienced diplomats by the Cultural Revolution, most third-generation ambassadors knew a foreign language, were recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and had an average of twenty years of working experience.

Liu’s fourth generation served as ambassadors from 1984 until the early 1990s. They were professionals with expertise, area specialization, and a sophisticated understanding of international affairs. They were recruited from a pool of younger, better-trained diplomats at leading positions within the MoFA. Most were educated at China’s foreign language universities, and almost all had had foreign language capabilities. Characterized by broadminded and cosmopolitan attitudes, the fourth generation made efforts to objectively present events, develop rapport with diplomats from other countries, and convey an appreciation of other cultures. Liu suggested the emergence of a distinct fifth generation of diplomats in the 1990s, trained in foreign languages and social sciences. Many, she hoped, would have gained a wide range of perspectives through graduate degrees abroad, be freer and bolder politically, driven by pragmatic rationale instead of ideology.

Considering China’s official representatives to Latin American countries over the past couple of decades, it is true that pragmatic considerations have been the priority in their day-to-day work, as they have accompanied an unprecedented expansion of trade and rapid growth in Chinese corporate presence abroad. However, these twin phenomena directly impacted the quality of staff in two ways. Firstly, the best young linguists and university graduates were drawn into international business and finance, often relinquishing secure government careers in favor of well-paid postings abroad as interpreters and managers. For instance, China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) in Beijing, a prime training ground for the country’s diplomats, saw the transfer of its graduates into MoFA careers drop as low as 30%.⁹ This, in turn, meant that those who did continue into diplomatic service commanded less respect among business representatives, making it harder for them to corral corporate leaders in the projection and promotion of national interests abroad. Seniority and Party rank are crucial to a smooth coordination of all aspects of policy and governance (both domestically and abroad), so when the overseas representatives of state-owned enterprises outrank local diplomats within the Communist Party nomenklatura, the response and cooperation level is lower.¹⁰

As it is helpful and possible to identify overarching tendencies in China’s foreign service staff, the fifth generation can be said to have come and gone without achieving the impact Liu had envisioned-a victim of China’s commercial expansion globally and the country’s integration into multilateral institutions. What followed at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, was a groundswell of national pride and an “assertive turn” in Chinese foreign policy in the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2008-a watershed moment that coincided with the 17^th National Congress of the Communist Party and the accession of Xi Jinping to the position of Vice President. Beijing published strategic policy papers for various global regions, and Chinese energy and telecommunications companies became highly noticeable actors worldwide. Similarly, public diplomacy regained its centrality in China’s foreign affairs-the poster child being the global roll-out of Confucius Institutes and various exchange programs from 2004. Embassies restructured their expenses by hiring local staff as drivers, receptionists, and security staff (though never as cooks), freeing up funds for more specialized Chinese staff from a more varied list of agencies and even think tanks (^{Martin 2021, 161}).

Better informed and with more robust backing at home, Chinese ambassadors fanning out from 2009 onwards had gained status and confidence: it can be affirmed that they constitute the People’s Republic’s sixth generation of diplomats. They have the backing of a more self-confident and financially sounder nation, and a more varied toolbox at their disposal. They have resources to travel more widely, garner greater attention in the media and among economic and political elites of their host countries, and form alliances with representatives of Chinese corporations for mutual benefit. This is manifest in press mentions and the frequency of radio interviews, in the number of public appearances at social, educational, and political events, visibility in social media posts, and an increased cohesiveness of the business community. The following section illustrates some examples.

5. Chinese Diplomats at Work

Former US diplomat William Burns observed that “diplomacy may be one of the world’s oldest professions, but it’s also one of the most misunderstood. It’s mostly a quiet endeavor, less swaggering than unrelenting, oftentimes operating in back channels, out of sight and out of mind” (2019). By profiling some of its emissaries against the background of China’s broader approach to the region, a picture emerges of a varied and increasingly refined diplomatic strategy. The evidence shows how China’s diplomats, despite their internal hierarchies, have embraced network diplomacy and are working self-consciously to improve their cross-cultural communication. The personality and strategy of individual diplomats carry even more weight, as the “pervasive overstaffing,” typical at many levels of China’s government (^{Li 2016, 42}), is not reflected at its embassies. As of 2021, no Chinese embassy in Latin America employed more than 55 staff members (in Mexico City) and most hover around 20, not including local employees as receptionists, consular administrators, security guards, drivers, and cleaners. This contrasts with as many as 600 employees at the United States’ largest embassy in the region in Bogotá.

6. Organizations

The two principal government entities responsible for China’s global strategy are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Commerce (MofCom). Most ambassadors are employed by the MoFA, including those who made their career at the IDCPC or even the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Nevertheless, there is occasional competition for top diplomatic posts from MofCom and other organizations.¹⁹ The intertwining of Party and State is a defining feature of China’s political system, and the IDCPC has evolved from the Party’s global outreach department into a politically well-connected arm of the MoFA (^{Li 2016, 57}). Some observers see the revitalization of the Department as part of Xi Jinping’s efforts to re-centralize political power within the Party (^{Hackenesch and Bader 2020, 10}).

Despite some infighting over who sets the tone at individual embassies, for China’s corporations and entrepreneurs, the most valuable information on foreign markets is invariably the annual reports researched and published online by the MofCom’s commercial attaché at every Chinese embassy. The 对外投资合作国别指南 [Country guides for foreign investment and cooperation] are detailed reports that can run to over 200 pages and are updated annually. In contrast to other countries, however, there is no “revolving door” between Chinese corporations and the diplomatic service.²⁰ Instead, it is not uncommon to find scholars from the Institute of Latin American Studies in Beijing taking up mid-level positions at embassies in the region, and several ambassadors have landed senior posts at leading international studies institutes after returning home. For instance, after leaving the embassy in Santiago de Chile in 2020, Xu Bu徐步 became the director of the China Institute of International Studies; Chen Duqing 陈笃庆, after a fulfilling career at the head of several Chinese missions abroad, was named in 2015 the director of the Brazilian Studies Center of the Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Furthermore, all retired senior diplomats automatically become members of the Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). In this way, the insights won by China’s diplomats are fed back into the ecosystem of China’s international politics and composted for the better growth of forthcoming generations.

7. Conclusions

Stuart Harris perceptively notes that “China does not expect partnerships to eliminate conflicts, [but] it does expect that conflicts on individual issues will not prevent cooperation on the bigger economic, political or strategic issues” (2007, 8). China’s strategic development of its diplomatic corps in Latin America suggests that it has nurtured diplomats with the character and abilities to grow and maintain such partnerships. Led by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Beijing government has created a professional foreign service corps that can keep pace with the role of one of the world’s leading economies and look the leaders of its multinational business in the eye. By building a large and varied body of diplomats with regional expertise and global acumen, China is able to pursue its domestic and international goals and participate actively in global and local conversations. As suggested in the introduction, the evidence shows how China’s diplomats, despite their internal hierarchies, have embraced network diplomacy and are working self-consciously to improve their cross-cultural communication and raise their country’s ability to influence the global discourse on critical issues.

The paper points to a variety of Party and government entities involved in China’s overseas operations but also highlights how relevant the MoFA’s evolution is in proactive coordination with the political leadership at home and the priorities of state-owned enterprises spread across the globe. Wendy Leutert has explored lateral transfers of executives between state-owned companies and emphasizes how these may be critical to understanding China’s politics and economics in the future (2018, 17). The same can be said of the need to gain better insights into the transfers of Chinese diplomats between countries and even track their personal connections with corporate representatives. There is no evidence of close links between the MoFA and the United Front Work Department; Chinese ambassadors today strive to be more accessible and transparent, whereas the United Front works indirectly and informally through multiple channels. While the Xi Jinping administration has worked to strengthen the Party within the government by centralizing processes and tightening the hierarchies, it has also allowed ministries to lead with their strengths. The Latin American Department of the MoFA is a remarkable example of such strengths, and other major powers with interests in this region of the world could do worse than taking some pages out of the Chinese diplomatic playbook.

The profiles featured above are snapshots of individuals who are part of a far larger apparatus. Each biography is unique; their characteristics, while representative of many in China’s diplomatic services, should not be simplified or generalized. Rather, several envoys leading China’s diplomatic efforts in Latin America are individuals whose approach offers a counterweight to the assertive tone of a small number of their peers dubbed “Wolf Warrior diplomats”: the assertive approach of the latter group is an exception to the rule and largely absent from China’s strategy in Latin America. The principal goal of Beijing’s envoys to the region has been, it appears, to build goodwill through greater visibility and approachability and ensure a favorable environment within which China’s investment and commercial goals can grow. Hopefully, this approach will inspire other scholars to pursue further studies of Chinese diplomats and their engagement with host countries, allowing for deeper and more diverse analyses and possible predictors of China’s diplomatic strategy.