I. Institutional incentives, struggle for power and evolution of security institutions in Mexico

The Mexican Armed Forces' participation in internal security activities is not new; nonetheless, they have been continuously used in public security matters since the administration of former President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). The deployment pattern of the Army and Navy in these activities continued and deepened during Enrique Peña Nieto's administration (2012-2018) with the approval of the Internal Security Act, which finalized with a greater constitutional reform in the early days of the administration of current President Andrés Manuel ^{López Obrador (2018}-).

This is a reminder that once a country has begun an institutional path, reverse-related costs are high. As Margaret Levi (1997) argued, there might be other choosing points, but the arrangements of certain institutional accords might obstruct an easy change of the initial choice (as cited in ^{Pierson, 2000}, p. 28)¹.

Source: ^{Aguilar Romero (2019)}.

Figure 1 Path dependence on the Armed Forces used for public security issues. 

In this sense, path dependence processes can operate to institutionalize political arrangements that turn out to be particularly vulnerable to any event or process that comes in a later stage of the political development (^{Pierson, 2004}). This translates in how path dependence works to shield decisions and arrangements, even when there are governmental changes or potential future political party transitions that are usual in the Mexican political scene.

This is especially important within the Mexican national context taking into consideration that changes of government affect previously established objectives, the design and implementation of policies, as well as the continuity of formulations and decisions. In this sense, it is essential to identify the main objective of each administration to point out motives for decisions and vulnerabilities throughout the period studied. Thus, political change or stability must be considered as an important factor to shield the research of these types of narratives, losing the institutional approach.

Figure 2 shows the analytical structure of an argument with a path dependence approach extrapolated to the political arena in order to understand the institutional results but, most importantly, how processes are implemented. According to ^{Pierson (2004)}, there are four interconnected political issues, meaning that each one of these characteristics make political and institutional inertias prevail.

Source: ^{Mahoney (2001)}.

Figure 2 Analytical structure of an explanation from a path dependence approach. 

Firstly, the main role of collective action is established. In politics, the consequences of the actions of an actor highly depend on other people's actions. An important factor is the absence of a linear relation between effort and effect. In those circumstances in which making a decision would generate high costs, actors must constantly adjust their behavior to the potential actions of other actors. If there is a decision to create a new political party, join a coalition or provide resources to a stakeholder, it will depend on the probability that other actors make the same decision (^{Pierson, 2004}).

The second characteristic refers to the high density of institutions. Institutions and policies to invest in specialization deepen relations with other actors, whereas developing particular social and political identities motivate both individuals and organizations. This causes greater attraction towards current institutional accords with regard to other hypothetic alternatives.

Actually, in institutionally dense environments, the main actions set the individual behavior towards difficult reverse paths (social actors make decisions and commitments based on current institutions and policies). Given this, there are two possible sources of path dependence in politics: power dynamics and social understanding patterns (^{Pierson, 2004}).

The third characteristic is set in terms of power as the possibility of using political authority to enhance power asymmetries. Actors can use such authority to change the rules of the game -through institutions and different policies- in order to strengthen their power. This not only produces a change of rules on their favor but also increases their own capacities to act politically and, at the same time, decreases their rival's capacities. These changes also result in adaptations that reinforce these tendencies towards uncertain, poorly engaged or vulnerable actors joining the winners or leaving the losers -change of party or interests in their parliamentary group- (^{Pierson, 2004}).

Accordingly, Pierson concludes that minor events that happen at the right moment can have greater and ever-lasting consequences, but the timing of these events is crucial because early events in a sequence are more important than the subsequent ones. In fact, an event that occurs 'too late' might not have effects, even when it shows that it might have had big consequences if the timing had been different. Finally, the key point within path dependence is inertia, because once the process is established, positive feedback -meaning measures or policies at different levels driven towards the same objective- moves towards the same equilibrium and probably this is going to be change-averse to subsequent events.

Pattern dependence on the Armed Forces for public security operations

Mexico's military body has been directed (from its origins) towards the confrontation of internal threats and problems. Combined with the decomposition of public security and justice bodies, this has generated an expansion of the Armed Forces, which has noticeably increased since the 2000's (^{Moloeznik, 2008}). Nevertheless, civilian authorities' low development levels and lack of capacity depends greatly on the preferential support of military authorities.

In addition, the paradigm that favors the continuity of the Armed Forces is the one generated between national security, within their jurisdiction, and public security, within the civilian authority, particularly considering that inter-governmental strategies at different levels of government have been a failure as they ignore structural variables. The complexity of national security agencies which deal with a lack of compatibility facing the public security agencies stands out as the main issue. There are other situations such as budget allocated, social and economic perspective of each type of agency (^{Rodríguez, 2017}).

The Armed Forces are designed and appointed to safeguard national security, that is, against scenarios in which "any of the main elements of the state such as the incumbent government, institutions, population, as well as national sovereignty and territorial integrity" are threatened (^{Rodríguez, 2017}, p. 19). However, military corporations are progressively involved in activities pertaining to civilian authorities. This is presented in the first attributions changes, meaning that they have changed from the defense of sovereignty and national defense to tasks such as:

destruction of drug growing areas, public safety actions, cleaning and reconstructing areas affected by natural disasters, reforestation in certain regions, reducing illiteracy, battling guerillas, direct fight against organized crime, reconstructing police institutions at federal, state and municipal levels, disaster zone protection, human remains recovery missions, safeguarding strategic facilities, security during electoral periods, public health crusades and attention to pandemics, among other problems (^{Rodríguez, 2017}, p. 134).

Power maximization conflict

The conflict between organizations to achieve the maximization of power can be explained by greater political attention from the president in order to promote personal and institutional agendas, and the presence of a struggle to reach bigger budgets in order to have more institutional capabilities, therefore causing conflicts for legal power (^{Rodríguez, 2017}).

One of the best examples of a power maximization conflict can be seen in a diplomatic cable from the United States Embassy in Mexico (2010) that points out how "Mexican security institutions often are seen as a sum-zero competition in which the success of an agency is seen as the failure of another; the information is carefully kept and the joint operations are almost unknown".

High-level political attention (political capital). Clearly, the conflict to get the attention of the president or political leader damages the intergovernmental coordination of cabinets. The secretary that best fulfills the president's instructions has a better chance to convey his necessities in order to accomplish their missions. This can be seen reflected in the allocation of higher economic resources when compared with other security institutions.

Fighting for budget (economic power). "Budget allocation" was identified as one of the main causes of structural conflict between national security organizations that has a direct effect on their coordination. The fight for budget cannot be left out of the political conflict between SEDEÑA and CNS in 2013 and 2014 over the affiliation of the Gendarmerie to any of these institutions. Capacity-building, even if it is just for some two thousand new officers of the federal civilian or military law enforcement agencies, requires a significant amount of extraordinary public financing, doctrine instruction and operational training of new cadres. Additional funding resources in any institution help to legally finance technical and administrative areas, as well as to build or remodel facilities. The mandate to equip new members creates new opportunity areas for financing other institutional capacities that can be shared with the rest of the organization or assigned internally, for example, when there are armament and equipment industries.

Theory of the origin and evolution of national security agencies

The theory of the origin and evolution of national security agencies as proposed by ^{Zegart (1999}, p. 336) is highly useful to understand power dynamics among the actors involved, such as the government, congress, political parties and other social actors. Zegart points out that the Executive prevails in decision-making regarding institutional changes over the rest of the actors that want to participate in the construction and evolution of a country's national security agencies. Zegart's propositions that explain the original process of construction and evolution of national security agencies are the following:

Proposition 1: The executive branch drives the creation of national security agencies. Congress plays, at best, only a secondary role.

Proposition 2: In national security affairs, existing bureaucratic actors have much to gain or lose with the creation of a new agency and will ight to preserve their own institutional interests.

Proposition 3: The evolution of national security agencies, like their creation, is driven by forces within the executive branch -by the president, by the agency itself, and by its supporters and opponents in other bureaucratic offices.

Proposition 4: National security agencies develop with sporadic, largely ineffectual oversight by the Congress. Members have neither the incentives nor the capabilities to keep constant watch over agency activities.

ii. Background of the use of the Armed Forces in public security matters

Participation of the Armed Forces in public security has been intricately linked to different strategies against drug trafficking. This phenomenon is relevant for two reasons, irst, because it has been the factor that has determined the different national or public security strategies, and second, because the fight against drug trafficking should not be a matter of national security but public safety. According to Rosas, Dammert, Magaloni, Ungar, and Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (2012), a partial preventive model, the right intelligence system and a justice system could face this threat directly and robustly. The previous analysis is essential to this research because it allows to identify the initial moments and the strengthening of the convergence between military and civilian institutions.

Therefore, it is necessary to start with the moment in which the Armed Forces began to fight drug trafficking. The Mexican Army has participated in anti-drug missions since 1938, when former President Lázaro Cárdenas attempted to put narcotics production under State control. Nonetheless, Luis Astorga mentions that it officially began in 1947 with the "participation of the Armed Forces in the fight against drugs and the creation of the Security Federal Direction (DFS, by its Spanish acronym) with personnel enrolled in the Army" and the support of units such as the 10th Infantry Battalion or the 18th Cavalry and aircraft Regiment to locate plantations (as cited in ^{García Luna, 2018}, p. 25). After this, in 1948, the 'Great campaign' began, which entailed the manual destruction of illicit crops (^{García Luna, 2018}).

The 'Canador Plan' started in 1996, which stands out because it was the first massive deployment of military troops for the task of eliminating plantations, with approximately 1,500 to 3,000 officers. In 1970, the Army and Air Force implemented strategies with the inhabitants of mountain areas to persuade them of dropping poppy and marihuana growing and harvesting, in addition to urging them to identify or break up drug trafficking organizations (^{Mendoza, 2016}). When president Luis Echeverría took office, anti-narcotics police groups were created with the objective of stopping the market that would potentially surpass governmental control (Toro, M. in Aguayo, S. in ^{Mendoza, 2016}).

Further on, the Condor Operation was implemented in 1977 and focused on drawing the attention to the 'Golden Triangle,' comprising Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango, especially the mountain area. Nevertheless, according to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) report, the mission had difficulties such as land access, aerial support, limited intelligence and communications capabilities.

In this sense, it was specified that the missions also sought to eliminate plantations, control of illegal trails and shutting down illegal laboratories (as cited in ^{Mendoza, 2016}).

In 1986, during Miguel de la Madrid's presidential term, the special forces unit was created in the Army, called the Special Forces Aeromobile Group (GAFE, by its Spanish acronym). The next year, the Mars Assignment Force began, which was the Condor Operation renamed (^{García Luna, 2018}). That same year, the Armed Forces were integrated to the brand-new National Civil Protection System -created in response to the earthquakes occurred in September 19^th, 1985, to face potential emergencies and natural disasters-, a situation that has allowed for projecting a positive and reliable image to society (^{Moloeznik, 2008}).

In this context, drug trafficking was typified as a national security threat in 1970; nonetheless, it was not until 1987 when Mexican president Miguel de la Madrid declared drug trafficking as a national security problem, and its control as a state matter (^{Mendoza, 2016}). This statement is a critical situation, considering that both drug trafficking and organized crime permeated -and it has remained so to this date- security institutions at all levels. In practice, these phenomena are related to public security, which eases the convergence of attributions both for the military and for police corporations. As ^{Barrón (2004)} expounds, the nature of drug trafficking poses the convergence of situations such as sovereignty, national security and corruption, but mainly, the subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian authorities, which leads to turn its organizations into hybrid police/military institutions.

In the 1990s the creation of the Control and Detection System through Mexican radars for detecting aircrafts that smuggled drugs into the country took place. In this period, there were several updates to the basic structure of the Navy, such as the release of their internal regulation in which drug-trafficking fight was the most important responsibility. Furthermore, one of the highest national violence levels was reported, especially towards the end of Carlos Salinas de Gortari's presidential term (^{Escalante, 2009}).

In this period, there was another critical juncture of the Armed Forces. The process of enlargement of their attributions continued because of the resolution of the Supreme Court (SCJN, by its Spanish acronym) that established that the three forces could "participate in civilian actions in favor of public security aiding civilian authorities" (as cited in ^{Moloeznik, 2008}). In other words, it is not limited exclusively to drug-trafficking fight, but recognizes the support to the population in disasters or weather contingencies -(the DN-III-E plan and the SM-AM-90 plan)-, reforestation and re-vitalization of ecosystems, and even vaccination tasks and cholera prevention within the Solidarity Program framework (^{Juárez, 2016}).

On the other hand, Armed Forces were deployed with the emergence of the National Liberation Zapatist Army (EZLN, by its Spanish acronym). According to the official version, this meant the retreat of the armed body to the jungle, enclosing and containing the threat, under the argument of the constitutional attribution that established as a "requirement of the government, to keep and safeguard the country's internal and public peace" (Salinas as cited in ^{Juárez, 2016}, p. 233).

Ernesto Zedillo's presidential term was characterized by important events. First, the amendment to Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution on December 31^st, 1995, stands out. This meant the first reference to the concept of public security in a document with federal jurisdiction in the following paragraphs:

...Public security is a task entrusted to the Federation, the Federal District, states and municipalities, in the respective competences established in the Constitution. The actions of the police will be ruled by the principles of legality, efficiency, professionalism and integrity.

The Federation, Federal District, states and municipalities will be coordinated in the terms pointed out in the law to establish a national public security system. (as cited in ^{Regino, 2007})

However, this adaptation did not translate into a better development of the concept and much less into its recognition as a fundamental right for Mexican citizens. In consequence, the General Act that established the coordination bases of the National Public Security System was passed in 1995. This new law stated a new approach to public security, maintaining the joint responsibility of the Federation, Federal District, States and Municipalities for public security. Thus, the attribution is of a state nature and it focuses on the prevention, prosecution of offences and crimes, imposition of administrative sanctions, reintegration of criminals and minor perpetrators, and all those that "contribute to achieving higher goals and safeguarding people's integrity and rights, as well as preserving liberties, order and public peace" (^{Ulloa, 2000}).

Establishing and setting the concept of public security became more complex when this was identified in the projection of the sectoral program, announcing elements that usually favor its own militarization. In 1995, as part of his first government report, the President announced the initiative of the Federal Organized Crime Act. When announcing their arguments, president Ernesto Zedillo stated that drug trafficking was the biggest threat to national security and revealed an increase in crime rates of organized groups which jeopardize, as a whole, the coexistence, values and traditions of the Mexican people.

In spite of the aforementioned analysis, in 1999 the Senate approved an initiative to create a Preventive Federal Police (PFP, by its Spanish acronym), comprising 4,800 officers, whose objective was to organize and watch over the operation of the pf. By the time, Ernesto Zedillo's speech had evolved into one that recognized the necessity of putting law enforcement first because "public security and justice represent a main duty of the state" (as cited in ^{Juárez, 2016}, p. 239) and that all previously strategies implemented had failed, concluding with the statement that all measures would be taken to avoid further failure. It is important to mention that this new institution also proposed the grouping of all the federal corporations, something that did not happened (^{Regino, 2007}).

The transition to democracy in 2000 represented a breaking point in the civil-military relation, because so far in history, both Mexico and military institutions had matured in a political scenario dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, by its Spanish acronym). As ^{Moloeznik (2008)} establishes, "a party other than PRI taking office, after the victory of Vicente Fox, brought out the institutionalism of the Mexican Armed Forces. Political alternation surpassed the litmus test." For the first time, the Executive and as such, the commander-in-chief, represented a new vision that sought out immediate legitimacy from military corporations on a national level.

In his inaugural address, Vicente Fox recognized a strong linkage between military institutions and public security when he mentioned that:

their loyalty to the Republic [of the Armed Forces], their strict compliance with their constitutional duties, their exemplary role in the drug-trafficking fight and civil protection and respect to the political processes of the country have become a key guarantee of democracy (^{Fox, 2000}).

Moreover, he stated that a "new political future, after 71 years" was coming, and recognized the existence of "inertias and atavisms." This speech allowed him to position a state reform through which he sought to demolish insecurity and topple impunity (^{Fox, 2000}). As such, in security matters there were important modifications as well as the creation of new bodies.

In 2001, the Public Security Secretariat (SSP, by its Spanish acronym) was created alongside the reform of the Attorney General's Office (PGR, by its Spanish acronym), both proposals previously made by his predecessor Ernesto Zedillo. The SSP, with its new legal framework, had the main objective of fighting organized crime through the coordination and unification of state and municipal governmental efforts. Nonetheless, when combating organized crime, the work of four institutions, the SSP, the PGR, the Navy and National Defense Secretaries (^{Juárez, 2016}), was clearly recognized.

From that point on, SEDENA established that "the main objective of Mexican militaries is to combat drug-trafficking and public insecurity," (as cited in ^{Moloeznik, 2008}, p. 161). With the previous information, it is easy to identify that this statement depended strongly on the Supreme Court ruling of 1996 about the power of the Armed Forces to participate in civilian activities in favor of public security.

That year, the Federal Investigation Agency (AFI, by its Spanish acronym) was created as the operational arm within the administrative structure of the PGR. Nonetheless, it points out that it was enriched with former militaries and that the personnel received training in a semi-militarized environment (^{PGR, 2012}). During 2002, the then National Defense Secretary, General Gerardo Clemente Ricardo Vega García, recognized that "the Army, in its behavior and actions, is indisputably subject by law to civilian authority" (Vega-García, 2003). This represented an imminent declaration of loyalty towards President Fox.

In this way, history confirms the construction of path dependence of the Mexican Armed Forces in public security matters. The central events that preceded the declaration of war on drugs by Felipe Calderón are: the declaration that classified the drug-trafficking fight as a national security matter; the resolution of the SCJN that authorized the Armed Forces to participate in public security issues to support civilian authorities; and the creation of the PFP with 4,800 military members.

Felipe Calderón: War on drugs

Genaro ^{García Luna (2018)}, Public Security Secretary during the administration of Felipe Calderón, stated that in the last 40 years there was structural and investment abandonment of police institutions at the municipal and state levels in Mexico.

Therefore, corruption took place when using the economic resources that originated from crime activities carried out by the police itself -such as bribery and handouts- to finance operational costs that were not satisfied. ^{García Luna (2018)} explains that in this scenario, he put forward the proposal of using military personnel. After this decision, the strategy was to block the institutional development of police officers, but also wearing the Armed Forces down in its new activities as a supporter of the civilian authority. This represents the construction and first step towards path dependence, making it a critical juncture.

In the 2007-2012 National Development Plan (PND, by its Spanish acronym) there were two central points for our analysis: organized crime and law enforcement institutions. About organized crime, it was recognized that these groups represented a strong threat to national security and the resources derived from illicit activities facilitate the conditions to overcome the capacities of police bodies in charge of fighting and prevention of organized crime. So, the necessity of collaboration with the Armed Forces is reaffirmed (Gobierno Federal, 2008).

Due to state weakness, one of the objectives, specifically number 8, was to regain the State strength and security in social coexistence through the direct and successful confrontation of drug-trafficking and other expressions of organized crime. This was composed of four strategies; nonetheless, only the first is relevant to this research, given that it represents the proposition that the Armed Forces will first be in charge of safekeeping the country's internal security and second, responsible for fighting organized crime (^{Gobierno Federal, 2008}). This became the first official declaration from a governmental entity that specifically granted authority to military corporations, beyond their responsibility for security at domestic levels.

In office, the president announced the National Campaign against crime that -through his power to deploy the entire Army- would send the Armed Forces to the streets with police-like attributions. Even, 10,000 soldiers joined the Federal Support Forces, an institution that was the strong arm of the then PFP (^{Regino, 2007}). In the first quarter, there where resounding results: organized crime-related executions had doubled the previous year numbers. Initially, force deployment had been focused on the most vulnerable states, where there was an astonishing increase in violence (^{Regino, 2007}).

President Felipe Calderón faced a difficult political scenario and used the security problem as a way to increase his government approval ratings. In the same way, discussion on the subject strengthened the international scenario and became an important point in the relation with the United States within multiple binational agreements. Finally, the president faced power games among political parties that, until that date, had blocked the creation of a state security policy (^{Astorga, 2015}).

Eventually, Calderón posed his intention of improving police institutions through professionalization and through the eradication of internal corruption. However, the violence levels reached the year after taking office obscured his vision and led the decision-making process to the path of militarization that had been underway. The increase in attribution was gradual but constant. In political terms, powerful actors favored the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, towards the mid-term, results were not as expected and the international public opinion towards the military strategy was critical due to poor local police conditions and corruption (^{Juárez, 2016}).

Based on the previous reconstruction, President Felipe Calderón issued in early 2009 the General National Public Security System Act (LGSNSP). This act, according to Article 21 of the Constitution, clearly defined the objective of "establishing the distribution of tasks and the foundations of coordination among Federations, states, Federal District and municipalities in this regard" (Article 1 of the LGSNSP) and, most importantly, with the purpose of evaluating and certifying the country's police bodies. This act stands out for defining that all the police corporations have to be civilian, disciplined and professional. It also recognized the importance of the promotion of citizen's participation and accountability of the public security institutions. Notwithstanding, results showed that the strengthening of the police at the federal, state and municipal levels was not adequate and this blocked the gradual roll-back of the Armed Forces.

Between 2009 and 2010 and because of the strong deployment, the Armed Forces were questioned over human rights matters and military jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there was military personnel integrated to the federal and local public administrations. For example, the National Defense Secretariat proposed to the Governor of Chihuahua the appointment of a retired Division General, Julián David Rivera Bretón, as Public Security Secretary and of Colonel, Alfonso Cristóbal García Melgar, as Police Municipal Director of Ciudad Juárez (^{Moloeznik, 2012}).

In response to criticism by both national and international non-governmental organizations, Felipe Calderón justified the action taken by saying: "Only by having truly professional police officers, we can make sure that the Armed Forces are relieved from their temporary and subsidiary positions of undergoing citizen's security, without posing a danger to society" (^{Juárez 2016}: 258).

Enrique Peña Nieto: National Gendarmerie, Military Police and the Internal Security Act

Path dependence theory shows that the route traced by Felipe Calderón's presidential term did not generate institutional blockades except when there was a moment of structural persistence. The administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto represents that phase of structural persistence. Although campaign discourse raised the reorientation of the public security strategy, governmental actions demonstrated the existence of continuity in the strategy. It is in these dynamics that the relevance of the approach stands out since these policies were, rather, the result of an existing path, backed not only by the discourse but also by the institutions, their structures and approaches.

At the beginning of his term Peña Nieto proposed the creation of a National Gendarmerie, which would be an organization different from the pf and which would consist of 40,000 military members under civilian rule (^{Hope, 2017}). The Armed Forces showed resistance to this proposal but, allegedly for budgetary restrictions, the Gendarmerie was created in 2013 with only five thousand members under military and police instruction (^{Hope, 2013}). In the end, the PF was maintained, the Armed Forces continued in public security operations, and the Gendarmerie became a small organization.

This new body became a division of the pf, opposite to what it was originally proposed to be: an intermediary body of military origin and identity. This plan sought to take advantage of the good image of the Armed Forces in order to build trust with society. It is important to highlight that even though this idea was altogether eliminated, upon defining the Gendarmerie as the seventh division of the PF, its training was military nonetheless (^{Hope, 2013}). In the same way, the existence of this new security institution, in the words of the head of the Interior Secretariat (SEGOB), Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, would enable both the Army and Navy to retreat to the barracks.

Notwithstanding, it was clear that in this setting the use of the Armed Forces in tasks assigned to civilian authority presented serious threats such as the persistence of high levels of violence. Because of this, the same military organizations demanded regulation and legal certainty regarding the lack of definition of concepts such as public security. As ^{Moloeznik (2012)} points out, ever since Felipe Calderon's term, the Armed Forces started the search for an "ad hoc legal instrument that allows them to withdraw from any type of complaint or legal process" (p. 139).

This concern, addressed by the PND as a challenge to the Armed Forces, required an immediate response. It identified the necessity of having a better legal framework -specifically in internal security matters- that could provide them with certainty in its acting as a military organization, as well as for respecting human rights (^{Gobierno de la República, 2013}).

In the PND there was a first approach to the concept of internal security as an element on its own. Particularly, it was agreed that, as the Constitution points out, the mission and purpose of the Armed Forces would be "defending the nation and contributing to its internal security" (^{Gobierno de la República, 2013}, p. 32).

Nevertheless, multiple criticism and gaps identified in the initiatives led to the passing of the Internal Security Act, published on November 30^th, 2017. This document, from which several controversies arose, maintained the established definitions and stated that internal security "responds to keep internal stability, peace and public order, and is a responsibility of the three government branches" (^{Cámara de Diputados, 2017}, p. 50). This seemingly justified the participation of the Armed Forces and made legislators assessed their involvement, as necessary. Once the Act was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the opposition parties condemned it strongly having identified multiple risks and vulnerabilities that were not answered, despite it being only one bill.

It is important to note that the Act would have institutionalized the Armed Forces' participation in several areas. That would have forcefully blocked all development plans in slate for police officers, in areas such as economic resources, training, and professionalization. Nevertheless, the greatest threat was that it would have replaced the police force in its function, thus creating a new panorama in which civilian authority would have been useless.

There were movements, groups and organizations that impetuously contributed to the declaration of unconstitutionality by the SCJN. The participation of the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, with 115 votes signed against the bill, also stands out. Nonetheless, these actions could also have been in response to the political parties' narratives under political junctures. This is where the next phase of the path dependence process, called reactive sequence, begins. In this phase, actors respond to prevailing agreements through a series of predictable answers and counter-answers. This stage is specifically important because it takes the process directly to its final result (^{Mahoney, 2001}).

The failure of the Internal Security Act sparked off the debate on the necessity of a framework that endorsed the Army day by day. However, from this particular point onwards it is necessary to highlight that even though it is not possible to have military personnel without a legal framework, creating a law that allows them to be on the streets without the necessary adjustments, favors directly the continuity of path dependence.

During Peña Nieto's government, there was a rise in the political power of the Armed Forces through the long reach of public debates and public opinion. There was also the absorption of new bodies comprised of civilians that contributed to their public security tasks. On the other hand, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Internal Security Act made clear that it was not a measure that catered correctly to the needs and considerations of the state's own survival. Even if it was victorious as a statement in favor of strengthening public security in Mexico, it was enough to keep alive the tenure in this route.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador: National Guard

Upon being elected president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) presented his Peace and Security National Plan. This document presented an ambitious plan that ranged from the elimination of corruption and the ethic regeneration of society to the reformulation of the fight against drug trafficking and the public security arena. In relation to the country's militarization, it began by revealing that in Mexico more than 200,000 people had been the murdered and more than 37,000 had disappeared as a result of a "police and warmongering strategy" (^{López-Obrador, 2018}, p. 10).

In the face of this scenario, the most important driving force was the public security plan, which was divided into three proposals, of which the first two are analyzed herein. Proposal number one revolved around rethinking national security and redirecting the Armed Forces, which had been worn down because of their fulfillment of tasks that were not within their jurisdiction. It also mentioned that the people's trust had decreased, a particular situation considering that in the previous administration this was a key element to maintain the status quo (^{López-Obrador, 2018}).

That same document recognized that military forces did not have the sufficient training to prevent and investigate crimes, which seemingly explains why human rights violations have taken place. Likewise, it accepts that the military deployment has disabled the civilian public forces in the tasks of crime prevention and fighting since 2006, and also acknowledges that forty thousand elements from the pf were poorly trained and mostly fulfilled administrative tasks.

Despite this alarming diagnosis, it declared that it would be "disastrous to relieve the Armed Forces from their current activities in the public security area" (^{López-Obrador, 2018}, p. 14). For this reason, there would be continuity in this provision taking into account Article 89 of the Constitution, favoring respect for human rights, as well as personal integrity and property. It is important to point out that as portrayed in AMLO'S Nation Project, the Armed Forces would disappear from the streets in the medium-term to make way for the National Guard, which would assume civil protection functions at a federal level on all issues (^{López-Obrador, 2018}).

The second proposal was the formal establishment of the National Guard. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to amend Article 76 (XV) of the Constitution so that this body could be an essential tool of the Executive branch for preventing crime, safeguarding public security and fighting crime in the country. The document proposed the participation of military and navy police officers, the former PF in addition to the recruitment of civilians, specifically around 50,000 new guards (^{López-Obrador, 2018}).

It is important to remember that President López Obrador's administration is characterized by the victory of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA, by its Spanish acronym) in the Executive power. Furthermore, it has the majority in the Federal Congress with 259 deputies and 59 senators, and the majority in 20 local congresses. This configuration shows the overwhelming power that MORENA and the president have at a national level. Nonetheless, this situation has also brought uncertainty on how this power would be used in the Mexican political scenario.

This represents the continuity of the status quo, where the Armed Forces continue to be deployed on the streets, but now with a constitutional support; that is, an institutionalization of this measure has taken place at a national level. Furthermore, in the transitory articles of the act concerning the creation of the National Guard, it is stated that in the next five years, both SEDENA and SEMAR are going to be involved in the hierarchic structure and discipline regime They will have control over the income admission tools, education, training, pro-fessionalization, promotions and benefits of the Armed Forces (DOF, 2019).